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CHINESE REGULATION OF ISSUER EARNINGS 
FORECASTS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN 
EX ANTE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
CHENGXI YAO* 
We would not think much of a military general staff 
or intelligence staff which told the field commander 
they were not going to give him their estimates as to 
the enemy's strength and dispositions for fear they 
might not be accurate or complete, but would prefer to 
give him something that they were sure was reliable, 
like information about the enemy's dispositions in 
World War II. 
-Homer Kripke (1972)1 
[T}he securities laws typically do not act as a Monday 
Morning Quarterback. 
-Stransky v. Cummins Eng. Co., lnc.2 
• Professor, Financial Regulation, Shantou University Business School, 
People's Republic of China; Juris Doctor, Boston College Law School; LL.M. 
with Distinction in Securities and Financial Regulation, Georgetown Univer· 
sity Law Center. I am grateful for the valuable comments by the Editorial Board 
of the William & Mary Business Law Review, and by Professor Allan Horwich 
of Northwestern University School of Law. 
1 Sidney Davidson, The Study Group on Objectives of Financial Statements: 
A Progress Report, 1973 STANFORD LECTURES IN ACCOUNTING 5, 8--9 (June 1, 
1973) (quoting Homer Kripke, Proceedings, New York State Bar Association 
Meeting (Jan. 27, 1972)). 
• 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economic theory suggests that corporate disclosures and en-
hanced information quality reduce information asymmetries be-
tween firms and investors, and between informed and uninformed 
traders. Reduction in information asymmetry in turn mitigates 
adverse selection, thereby increasing the firm's stock liquidity in 
the secondary market and lowering the firm's cost of capital in the 
primary market. a Empirical studies of the Chinese markets and of 
the U.S. markets both find that management earnings furecasts4...._ 
one of the most informative corporate disclosures5-affect stock 
prices.6 In the United States, to encourage issuer disclosure of 
s &e, e.g., Anne Beyer, Daniel Cohen, Thomas Z. Lys & Beverly R. Walther, 
The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. 
AcCT. & EcoN. 296 § 3.2.2.2 (2010); Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 
32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, § 4.1 (2001). 
4 The AlCPA distinguishes a "financial forecast" from a "financial projection," 
defining the former as a presentation of management's expectations of finan-
cial position based on assumptions it expects to materialize, and the latter as 
one given one or more hypothetical assumptions. A "financial forecast" is ap-
propriate for "general use," whereas a "financial projection'' would normally be 
appropriate for "limited use." See AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJEC-
TIONS § 301.08(c)-{d) (2001), http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standarda/Audit 
Attest/DownloadableDocuments/AT-00301.pdf [https://perma.cc/73B3-JV5W]; 
AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION chs. 3--4 (2013). For the 
purpose of regulatory treatment, the terms "forecast," "projection," "prediction," 
and "estimate" may be used interchangeably in this Article. See, e.g., Public 
Hearings on Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of Economic Performance and 
Related Subjects, Exchange Act Release No. 9844 (1972); Beecher v. Able, 374 
F. Supp. 341, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (2016); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.3b-6(c) (2016); 15 U.S. C. § 77z-2(i)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2012). 
5 See Sarah B. Clinton, Joshua T. White & Tracie Woidtke, Differences in the 
Information Environment Prior to Seasoned Equity Offerings Under Relaxed 
Disclosure Regulation, 58 J. ACCT. & ECON. 59, 64 (2014); see also Homer Kripke, 
The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1151, 1197-201 (1970). 
B For literature studying the U.S. stock markets, see, for example, Paul M. 
Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature, 31 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 405, 425 (2001). For literature studying the Chinese stock mar-
kets, see, for example, Yihong Jiang, Xun Tong & Xia Yang, Information Con-
tent of Earnings Forewarnings, 5 CHINA ACCT. & FIN. REV. 145, 146, 162 (2003); 
Liang He, Issuer Earnings Forecasts: Market Reactions and Regulation, 
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projections and other forward-looking information, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1979 adopted a safe harbor 
rule under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) respectively. 7 Noting 
that the SEC safe harbor rules had "not provided companies mean-
ingful protection from litigation," Congress enacted the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) to both "dis-
courage" frivolous litigation and "encourage" issuer dissemination 
of forward-looking statements. a 
Under the dichotomy of the mandatory/voluntary forward-
looking disclosure regime in the United States, reporting issuers 
are required to make the forward-looking disclosures specified in 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K, ''Management's Discussion and Analy-
sis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations" (l\1:D&A).9 
The MD&A must be included in the issuers' registration state-
ments filed under the Securities Act; the registration statements, 
§§ 3.1, 3.5 (May 2005) (Ph.D clissertation, Southwest University of Finance and 
Economics, China). But see Mei Luo & Yunling Song, How Credible Are Man-
agers' Earnings Forecasts in the Chinese Market?, 9 FIN. RES. 168, 169, 179 
(June 12, 2012); Xinsheng Cheng, Youchao Tan & Yu Cheng, Management 
Forward-Looking Disclosures: Have They Reduced Information Asymmetry?, 
39 J. FIN. & ECON. 42, 51 (2013). 
7 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2016); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2016); Safe Harbor 
Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, Exchange Act Release 
No. 15,944, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,810, 38,814 (July 2, 1979). For a history of the SEC's 
positions with respect to issuer projections prior to its adoption of the safe har-
bor, see HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 
REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM'N A-265, app. X-A: Evolution of SEC Policies and Practices Regarding 
Projections (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter SOMMER REPORT]. 
• See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stet. 737 (1995); Securities Litigation Reform Conference Committee Report, 
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 49 n.29 (1995). In 1998, Congress enacted the Se-
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), to prevent using 
State courts to frustrate the objectives of the PSLRA See Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
For literature studying PSLRA, see LoUIS Loss, JOEL SEIJGMAN & TROY 
PAREDES, 10 SECURITIES REGULATION ch.ll.D.4g n.510 (5th ed. 2014). For lit-
erature studying SLUSA, see id. ch.ll.B.lO n.ll5. 
• 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016). For a description of the historical origin of 
I tern 303, see Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange 
Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,716 (Apr. 24, 1987). 
ii
i
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duty to disclose, 16 and the contrast between fraud prohibition 
and mandatory disclosure.I7 Analyzing the relationship between 
nondisclosure-based Item 303 violations and antifraud violations, 
the literature views some case law as rejecting an automatic 
finding of an antifraud violation based on an Item 303 violation 
and other case law as holding that Item 303 violations can be, 
could be, or might be the basis for an antifraud violation.JS Two 
recent decisions, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley and In re 
NVIDIA Corporate Securities Litigation, however, do not appear 
to demonstrate any substantive conflicts among the circuits on 
the issue than a facial linguistic divergence.I9 
materiality should vary with context: in a clisclosure context, materiality simply 
prohibits lying and half-truths; in an insider trading context, materiality bars 
insider's secret trading profits and thus should be of a more exacting standard; 
in a 10b-5 implied right of action context, materiality functions similar to the 
common law tort action for misrepresentation; in contrast, in Bcu;ic, the Court 
defined materiality in a free-standing context). 
16 See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose 
Under Rule lOb-5, 57VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1644-45 (2004). Materiality refers to 
whether a piece of information would likely be important to the reasonable inves-
tor, whereas duty refers to whether there is a duty to disclose the information. 
ld. at 1644. Not all material information must be disclosed; on the other hand, 
immaterial information may be required to be disclosed. ld. at 1645. For exam-
ple, not every piece of information required in an issuer's periodic reporting is 
going to be important to investors in every instance. Id. at 1645 n.18. See also 
Brian Neach, Note, Item 303's Role in Private Causes of Action Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 76 NarRE DAME L. REv. 741, 752--53 (2001) (arguing that 
Item 303's two-pronged disclosure standard does not purport to determine 
whether or not particular information is material; it only imposes on manage-
ment a duty to disclose specified information that may or may not be material). 
17 See, e.g., Joseph Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The 
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223, 230--32 (2002). 
Disclosure regulation can be divided into fraud prohibitions and mandatory 
disclosures: fraud prohibitions are designed to eliminate deception in disclosure 
and mandate accuracy; mandatory disclosures impose affirmative content-based 
disclosure obligations. ld. 
18 See cases cited by Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 16, at 1648 n.25, 
1650-53 nn.35-36, 38, 42; see also cases cited by ROBERT BROWN, THE REGU-
LATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 2A-72-73 nn.358--61.1, 362 (3rd ed. 2013). 
19 Compare Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100--01 (2d Cir. 
2015) (concluding that a failure to make a required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q 
filing can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim only if 
(i) the omission satisfies Basic's probability/magnitude test for materiality, 
and (ii) all of the other requirements to sustain a Section 10(b) action, including 
ii
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safe harbor rules do not expressly impose a "duty to update" 
condition, 25 its interpretation of the "reasonable basis" require-
ment for earnings projections effectively incorporates such a 
duty.26 While the statutory safe harbor rule expressly declares 
that "[n]othing in this section shall impose upon any person a 
duty to update a forward-looking statement,"27 it stops short of 
providing an exemption from antifraud liability for failure to 
update a forward-looking statement that was accurate when 
insider trading; statute or regulation requiring disclosure; and inaccurate, in-
complete, or misleading prior diaclosures); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321-22 (2011): 
[I]t bears emphasis that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) do not create 
an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material informa-
tion. Disclosure is required under these provisions only when 
necessary 'to make ... statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading.' ... 
Even with respect to information that a reasonable investor 
might consider material, companies can control what they have 
to disclose under these provisions by controlling what they say 
to the market. 
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2016), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2016). 
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (2016); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, 
supra note 7, 44 Fed. Reg. at 38,813. As with "duty to update," the SEC simi-
lsrly adopts a straddling position on "duty to disclose assumptions" underlying 
a projection. See, e.g., Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic 
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, Exchange Act Release No. 15,305, 
43 Fed. Reg. 53,246, 53,248 (Nov. 15, 1978): 
[T]here may be instances where reasonably based and ade-
quately presented projections would significantly add to the mix 
of information availsble to investors in the absence of disclosure 
of underlying assumptions .... [U]nder certain circumstances 
the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be material to an 
understanding of the projected results .... [D]isclosure of the 
projection without this information might be misleading. 
Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, supra note 7, at 38,812: 
While the Commission has determined to follow the Advisory 
Committee's recommendation that disclosure of assumptions 
not be mandated under all circumstances, ... [t]he Commission 
also believes that the key assumptions underlying a forward 
looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure 
may be necessary in order for such statements to meet the 
reasonable basis and good faith standards embodied in the 
[safe harbor] rule. 
27 15 U.S. C. § 77z-2(d) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (2012). 
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made but has become inaccurate due to subsequent events.2s 
Judicial decisions stay divided on the existence and scope of 
such a duty 29 --divisive enough to have caused concern over 
whether a snapshot act would trigger a motion picture production 
obligation.ao Academic literature relies upon the corporate ''half-
truth" doctrineat as the foundation for "a narrow and limited 
duty to update" theory.a2 
28 See, e.g., John Coffee, The Future of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 992 
(1996); Robert Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Se-
curities Fraud, and Rule JOb-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 28 (1998); BROWN, supra 
note 18, at 1-00. 
29 See, e.g., Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Contin-
uous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: ''Are We There 
Yet?': 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 148-49 (1999) (noting that disagreement exists 
among the federal circuit courts as to whether the duty exists at all: the 
Seventh Circuit says no; the First, Second, and Third Circuits say yes, and 
among those circuits that say yes, there is disagreement as to the breadth and 
limits of the duty); Steven Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and 
Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initia-
tives, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225, 232 (2002) (observing that the other cir-
cuits, specifically the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh, 
have opted not to directly confront the question of whether a duty to update 
exists). See also Stuart Cohn & Erin Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities 
Class Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation 
of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 940 n.l51 (2010) (pointing out that 
the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements post-dates much of 
the litigation in this area and that the safe harbor's lack of reference to up-
dating projections suggests that projections initially protected under the safe 
harbor provisions would not lose their protection by virtue of subsequent events. 
However, this issue has not been judicially resolved.). 
30 See Carl Schneider, Duty to Update: Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require 
the Commencement of a Motion Picture?, 3 INSIGHTS 3 (Feb. 1989) (commenting 
on frequently cited duty-to-update cases); Oesterle, supra note 29, at 143 (stating 
that a robustly applied duty to update doctrine can in effect approximate a con-
tinuous disclosure obligation). 
31 See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1098 (1991) 
(describing a corporate disclosure that is literally true but misleading due to 
a material omission as nothing more than "a half-truth"); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.408 (2016), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.10b-5(b) (2016). 
32 Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Infer-
ences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 118-20 (2000) (applying 
the half-truth doctrine to the prior forward-looking statement), with Gregory 
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In contrast to the voluntary earnings projection regime in the 
United States,aa the Chinese securities regulation applies a bi-
furcated mandatory/voluntary earnings projection regime and 
includes both types of projection disclosure in the public disclo-
sure system.34 As the first study published in a U.S. law journal 
comprehensively examining the Chinese projection regulatory 
policies and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange listed 
issuers' projection practices, in light of disclosure theories in U.S. 
accounting, economics, and legal literatures, this Article con-
tributes to the extant literature on regulation of issuer projec-
tions and more broadly of issuer forward-looking information. 
Following this introduction of motivating disclosure theme and 
a review of U.S. legal literature on mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure, Part I of the Article explores the origins and charac-
teristics of issuer mandatory/voluntary earnings projection prac-
tices in China against the historical evolutions of the Chinese 
stock market. Part II discusses the Chinese disclosure and en-
forcement policies governing issuer earnings projections, bench-
marked to disclosure theories in accounting and economics 
Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public Company 
Disclosure and the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2199, 2251--{;5 (2000) (applying the half·truth doctrine to the present disclosure); 
see also THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 12.9[10] (2015) ("When projections are made there is no implication that they 
will be updated. Instead, the only implication is that they were made on a rea· 
sonable basis and in good faith."). 
33 The Wheat Commission in 1969 recommended that the SEC's long· 
standing policy banning projections in issuers' SEC filings not be changed. See 
SEC, DISCWSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 95--96 (1969) [hereinafter WHEAT 
REPORT]. The Sommer Commission in 1977 reversed the Wheat Commission's 
recommendation, and opted for a policy of encouraging issuer disclosures of pro· 
jections and material underlying assumptions. SOMMER REPORT, supra note 7, 
at 344-45. Since 1978, the SEC has adopted a voluntary projection policy. 
Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, supra 
note 26, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,248. 
34 For the bifurcated mandatory/voluntary earnings projection regime in the 
securities offerings context, see Part LA, infra; in the significant corporate as· 
sets restructuring context, see Part I.B, infra; in the listed issuer periodic and 
current reporting context, see Part I. C, infra. 
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literature, SEC Regulation S-K Item 10(b) "Commission Policy 
on Projections," and U.S. legal theories. 
Extending SEC Regulation S-K Item 10(b) to the Chinese 
setting, Subpart II.A critiques the current disparate and frag-
mented projection regulation among the stock exchanges and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It recommends 
integrating issuer public projections into a CSRC centrally admin-
istered public disclosure system that provides a transparent and 
level playing field for state-controlled and private entrepreneur-
controlled issuers. Departing from Item 10(b)'s controversial "duty 
to update" concept, however, Subpart II.A recommends an eco-
nomic efficiency-based voluntary disclosure policy. To fill a criti-
cal void in the Chinese legal and disclosure systems, Subpart II.B 
imports two key features from the U.S. systems for being equally 
important and relevant to the Chinese issuers and investors 
under an institutional setting of predominant state-ownership of 
capital markets: issuer safe harbor protection versus investor 
private right of action; and fact versus opinion distinction in 
determining fraud liability. It recommends an ex ante legal 
framework with balanced public-private enforcement, to im-
prove upon the current ex post, Fidelity regulation-based, solely 
public enforcement. In conclusion, disclosure recommendations 
based on U.S. legal and economic theories are highlighted in two 
dimensions: those uniquely applicable to the Chinese market, 
and those of potential common interest to Chinese and U.S. dis-
closure systems. 
I. TRIGGERS OF ISSUER EARNINGS FORECAST DISCLOSURES 
A. IPO and Earnings Projection Disclosure 
Following the establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1990,35 
consistent with its planned economy philosophy transplanted to 
35 About Us, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., http://www.sse.eom.cn/aboutus/sse 
introduction/introduction/ [https://perma.cc/YAR9.J64D]; About Us, SHENZHEN 
STOCK EXCH., http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutuslbsjslbsjj/index.shtml [https:/1 
perma.cc/LJ29-5AUH]. 
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the capital markets, China's central planners adopted an Annual 
IPO Offering Allowance in 1993, which was superimposed with 
an Annual IPO Issuer Quota in 1996.36 The Offering Allowance 
fixed the total face value of stock shares to be floated for the year, 
regardless of the actual offering proceeds. The Issuer Quota set the 
number of issuers to go IPO in a year. 37 
A regime of mandatory earnings projections by IPO issuers was 
instituted in 1993, when China's first Company Law (1994) and 
the State Council's Provisional Regulation of Securities Offerings 
and Trading (1993) mandated that IPO issuers make and disclose 
their earnings projections for the forthcoming year in the IPO 
prospectus.3B The IPO offering price was set by a formula supplied 
by the CSRC along the following form; issuers were to project 
earnings within the confines of given regulatory formulations; 
36 State Council, SC 1993-112: Provisional Regulation of Securities 
Offerings and Trading, art. 12(2) (1993), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/tlb 
/tlfg/xzfg_8248/200802/t20080227_191560.html [https://perma.cc/PX8F-3VEF] 
(imposing Offering Allowance requll-ement); Office of the State Council, OSC 
1996-37: National Securities and Futures Work Plan for 1996 § 2 (1996) 
(Westlaw China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China)) (imposing Issuer Quota requll-ement). 
The Issuer Quota was superimposed on the Offering Allowance to address local 
governments' avoidance of Offering Allowance by reducing the offering allow-
ance per firm through reverse stock splits and increasing the number of issu-
ers in their localities. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1995-162: Notice of 
Dispositions of Certain Issues Related to Stock Offerings § 1 (1995) (Westlaw 
China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China)). 
37 SC 1993-112, supra note 36, arts. 22--23; OSC 1996-37, supra note 36. See 
also CIDNA SEC. REG. COMM'N & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR 2013-23: STOCK 
OFFERING REFORM-A COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS 10-12 (2013), http://www 
.sse.com.cn/researchpuhlicationsljointresearcblclc_20130305_3686457.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/5J7Z-MX7V]. 
38 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 1993-16: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 137(4) (1994) (Westlaw China ]J:f;l!: (Westlaw China)) 
[hereinafter CoMPANY LAw 1994]; SC 1993-112, supra note 36, art. 15(9); see also 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1993-39-Att2: Form and Contents of Disclo-
sure Guide No. !-Prospectus (Provisional), ch. 3 § 19 (1993) (Westlaw China 
]J:f;ll: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1997-2: Form and Con-
tents of Disclosure Guide No. !-Prospectus, ch. 3 § 19 (1997) (Westlaw China 
]J:f;ll: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-131: Notice Con-
cerning Prospective Issuers and Their Auditors (2000) (Westlaw China ]J:f;l!: 
(Westlaw China)). 
l
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Clllna's first Securities Law (1999) introduced a legal Verifica-
tion and Approval System, replacing the administrative Offering 
Allowance and Issuer Quota System.42 The evolving Verification 
and Approval System has incorporated increased market elements 
since 2004: (1) it allows greater roles for the managing underwriter 
to select, sponsor, and recommend IPO candidates to the CSRC, 
replacing the government's direct selection of issuers under the 
Offering Allowance and Issuer Quota Systems;43 and (2) it autho-
rizes a book-building process to determine the IPO price, which 
no longer is set or need be approved by the CSRC. 44 
6 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 453 (1998) (sampling A-share IPOs listed on the SHSE 
during the December 1990-December 1993 period, and fincling an average of 
289 percent IPO underpricing and significantly positive excess market returns 
of overpriced A-share IPOs persistent for over 350 days, indicating a real rather 
than speculative phenomenon). 
42 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 1998-12: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 14-15 (1999) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)) 
[hereinafter SECURITIES LAw 1999]; see also China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 
2001-48: Guidance for Managing Underwriters in Connection with Stock Offer-
ings, arts. 1-2 (2001) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)). 
43 The market-oriented underwriter sponsorship procedure under the Veri-
fication and Approval System evolved from the earlier government allocation-
based underwriting deal quota procedure under the Offering Allowance and 
Issuer Quota System. For a regulatory history, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, 
CSRC 2003-18: Provisional Regulation of Sponsorship for Securities Offering 
and Listing (2004) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. 
Comm'n, CSRC 2004-1: Notice of Implementation of "Provisional Regulation of 
Sponsorship for Securities Offering and Listing," , 5 (2004) (W estlaw China 7Jj$: 
(Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Securities Offering and Listing 
Sponsorship Procedure: A Significant Reform (2003), http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
/pub/newsite/fxjgb/gzdt/200701/t20070108_69302.html [https://perma.cc/KV76 
-BDPM]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2009-63: Regulation of Sponsorship 
for Securities Offering and Listing, arts. 2--3 (2009), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub 
/newsite/fxjgb/baxyjg/bjflfg/20 1308/t20 130823_232989.html [https://perma.cc 
/2K6M-85TR]. 
44 Book-building commenced as an experiment in January 2005, and grad-
ually evolved to become market-based IPO pricing and allocation mechanisms. 
For its regulatory history, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2004-162: Notice 
Concerning Certain Matters Related to an Experimental Book-building Pro-
cess for Initial Public Offerings (2005) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: (Westlaw China)); 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Offering Exam. & Verif. Memo. No. 18: Regulatory 
Requirements Applicable to Institutions Participating in IPO Book-Building 
Process (2004), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/fxb/shbzbwl/200412/t200412 
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As a threshold matter, however, firms' access to the IPO 
market fundamentally remains a central planning model, from 
China's first Securities Law (1999) to its current Securities Law 
(20 14). Before a firm is eligible to file a "preliminary prospectus," 
it must file an "application prospectus," which is "examined and 
verified" by CSRC's functional offices and an Offering Examina-
tion and Verification Committee (Offering E&V Committee), com-
posed of the CSRC-designated outside technical advisors and 
CSRC staff liaison.45 The application prospectus procedure is a 
means for the government to determine, importantly, the applicant 
firm's "ability for achieving sustained profitability." Such ability 
is to be assessed based on criteria including "whether material 
changes have occurred, or will likely occur, to the business model 
of the applicant or to the business environment of the industry 
sector of the applicant, with material adverse effects on the appli-
cant's ability for achieving sustained profitability."46 The CSRC 
approves or disapproves the firm's IPO application considering the 
Examination and Verification Opinion rendered by a panel of the 
Offering E&V Committee,47 and giving deference to the decisions 
13_69344.html [https://perma.cc/36XN-4KVX]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 
2006-37: Regulation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, ch. 2 (2006) 
(Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2010-
69: Regulation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, art. 5 (2010) (Westlaw 
China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-78: Regu-
lation of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, art. 5 (2012) (Westlaw China 
7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-95: Regulation 
of Securities Offerings and Underwriting, ch. 2 (2013) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ 
(Westlaw China)). 
45 See SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 14; NAT'L PEOPLE's CONG., 
PRC 2014-14: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 22 
(2014) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)) [hereinafter SECURITIES LAw 
2014]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-122: Regulation of Initial Public 
Offering and Listing, art. 35 (2016) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)); 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2009-62: Charter of Offering Examination and 
Verification Committee, art. 6 (2009) (Westlaw China 7Jj$ (Westlaw China)) 
[hereinafter OFFERING E&V COMMITTEE CHARTER]. 
46 &e SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 13(2); CSRC 2015-122, 
supra note 45, art. 30. 
47 &e SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 10; SECURITIES LAW 2014, 
supra note 45, art. 10; OFFERING E&V COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 45, 
arts. 3, 29. 
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of the National Development and Reform Commission, the provin-
cial government of the issuer's principal place of business, and 
"other relevant government departments," to "ensure compliance 
with national industrial policies and other national policies."4B 
At the end of 2013, China's Communist Party Central Commit-
tee announced China's plan of a grand offering reform to move 
from the current Verification and Approval System to a disclosure-
based Registration System, and to accomplish key reform targets 
by 2020.49 
As IPO pricing evolved from a government-determinants model 
in 1993,50 to a government approval model in 1999,51 and to a gov-
ernment filing model since 2004,52 mandatory earnings projections 
as the basis for IPO pricing lost their raison d'etre. In 2001, the 
CSRC gave issuers the option of disclosing in the IPO prospectus 
either earnings projections or additional line items related to the 
use of offering proceeds, offering price, and dividend policy.53 The 
CSRC also introduced a line item in the prospectus mandating 
"a brief discussion by management of ... any known or uncertain 
factors that have caused or may cause serious difficulties to the 
issuer''54_an MD&A idea that has, since 2006, developed into a 
full-fledged, mandatory ''Management Discussion and Analysis" 
section in IPO and following-on offering prospectuses and in issuer 
48 CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, arts. 11, 33, 36--37. 
49 See CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENT. COMM., RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON CERTAIN CRITICAL ISSUES 
RELATED TO ALL-AROUND AND DEEPENING REFORMS, § 3(12) (2013), http://www 
.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/content_2528179.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2J2-F3UK]; Xi 
Jinping, Explanatory Note to Resolutions, , 2(4) (2013), http://www.gov.cn/ldhd 
/2013-11/15/content_2528186.htm [https://perma.cc/B243-NV6Z]. 
60 See supra notes 38--39 and accompanying text. 
51 See SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 28; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., 
PRC 1999-29: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBIJC OF CHINA, art. 131(2) 
(1999) (Westlaw China Jj"j$ (Westlaw China)) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW 1999]. 
52 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2004-21: SECURITIES LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CH1NA, art. 28 (2004) (Westlaw China Jj"j$ (West1aw China)) 
[hereinafter SECURITIES LAW 2004]; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2004-20: 
COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 131 (2004) (West1aw 
China Jj"j$ (West1aw China)) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW 2004]. 
53 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-41: Form and Contents of Dis-
closure Guide No. 1-IPO Prospectus, §§ 12-13 (2001) (West1aw China Jj"j$ 
(Westlaw China)). 
54 Id. § 10 art. 141. 
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periodic reports. 55 In 2005, the Company Law was amended: the 
mandatory earnings projection clause was eliminated and replaced 
by the term ''Verification and Approval System" introduced by the 
first Securities Law (1999). 56 
The current bifurcated mandatory/voluntary policy on earnings 
projections in connection with an IPO was adopted by the CSRC 
in 2006, when it adopted the Regulation of Initial Public Offering 
and Listing.57 An IPO issuer must make earnings projections if 
55 For SHSE and SZSE's Main Board and SZSE's SME Board issuers, see 
Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-5: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide 
No. 1-IPO Prospectus, ch. 2 § 11 (2006) (Westlaw Clrina 7J1t (Westlaw Chlna)); 
Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-2: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide 
No. 11-Public Offering Prospectus of Listed Issuer, ch. 2 § 7 (2006) http://www 
.sse.com.cnllawandrules/regulations/disclosure/a/Disclo20060509a.pdf [https:/1 
perma.cc/RX59-MRVK]; Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-24: Form and 
Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 2--Annual Report, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3 (2015), 
http://www.carc.gov.cnlpublzjhpublidG00306201/201406/t20140607_255636.htm 
[https://perma.cdF3ZZ-Z4YR]; Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-22: Form 
and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 3--Semi-Annual Report, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3 
(2014), http://www.carc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublidG003062011201406/t20140607_2556 
37.htm [https://perma.crJM6JQ-4G45]. 
For SZSE's ChiNext Market issuers, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 
2014-28: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 28--IPO Prospectus of 
ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 9 (2014) http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpublzjhpublic/zjb/201406 
/t20140613_256062.htm [https://perma.cc/67UE-M4ZW]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, 
CSRC 2014-30: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 35--Public Offering 
Prospectus of ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 7 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjh 
public/zjb/201406/t20 140613_256065.htm [https://perma.cc/8MGL-WZ3F]; China 
Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-43: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide 
No. 30---Annual Report ofChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 4, ch. 3 § 3 (2013), http://www 
.csrc. gov.cnlpub/newsite/flb/fl.fglbmgf/xxpl/xxplnr/20 1310/t20 131017 _236416 
.html [https://perma.cc/5KDA-ZX23]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-
29: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 31--Semi-Annual Report of 
ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 3, ch. 3 § 3 (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite 
/flb/flfglbmgf/xxpllxxplnr/201310/t201310 17_236417 .html [https://perma.cc 
17MUM-2G6B]; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-21: Form and Contents of 
Disclosure Guide No. 20---Quarterly Reports of ChiNext Issuer, ch. 2 § 3 (2013), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/flblflfglbmgflxxpl/xxplgz/201310/t20131021 
_236589. html [https://perma.cc/F27 J-PLPB]. 
55 See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2005-42: COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 135 (2006) (Westlaw China 7J1t (Westlaw China)). 
57 See Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2006-32: Regulation of Initial Public 
Offering and Listing art. 68 (2006), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/zjh 
/200804/t20080418_14502.htm [https://perma.cc/D7FT-YDB4]; see also CSRC 
2015-122, supra note 45, art. 56. 
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the offering proceeds are applied to make any "Significant Asset 
Purchase,"58 defined to mean a purchase by the issuer when (1) the 
ratio of the gross asset value (or net asset value) of the asset to be 
purchased to the gross assets (or net assets) of the issuer as re-
ported in its consolidated financial statements of the most recent 
year is at least 50 percent; or (2) the ratio of the business income 
generated in the immediately preceding year by the asset to be 
purchased to the business income of the issuer in the same period 
is at least 50 percent. 59 An IPO issuer may make earnings pro-
jections if "it believes that such earnings projections are useful to 
informed investment decisionmaking by investors, and it is con-
fident of its forecasting ability ."so 
Regardless of whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, 
an IPO issuer's earnings projections must be made in the form of 
an Issuer Earnings Projection Report, consisting of: 
• a projected earnings table, which must be in the 
same format as the issuer's income statement; 
• notes, disclosing key underlying assumptions and 
forecasting methodology; and 
• a uniform cautionary legend, alerting investors to 
"use projections with caution due to uncertainties 
associated with assumptions."61 
An Auditor's Report of Attestation of Management Earnings Pro-
jections must be appended to the Issuer Earnings Projection 
Report.62 Both reports must be made exhibits to the IPO pro-
spectus.63 
Regardless of whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary 
and subject to an undefined force majeure exoneration, in the 
event of an over-projection by 20 percent or more determined ex 
post, both the legal representative of the issuer and the attesting 
auditor must make public apologies at the shareholder meeting 
and in CSRC-designated media. The issuer representative may 
58 CSRC 2006-5, supra note 55, art. 84. 
59 &e CSRC 2006-2, supra note 55, art. 39. 
oo &e CSRC 2006-5, supra note 55, art. 84. 
"' Id. arts. 85--86. 
62 Id. arts. 8, 124. 
as Id. art. 128. 
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additionally receive a CSRC warning. 64 If the over-projection 
reaches 50 percent, the issuer shall be suspended from access to 
the public offering market for a period of three years. 65 Earnings 
projections in connection with follow-on offerings (public or private) 
by listed issuers are governed by a mandatory/voluntary disclo-
sure policy similar to that for an IPO issuer.66 
B. Listed Issuer Significant Assets Restructuring and Earnings 
Projection Disclosure 
Historically, a typical Chinese state-owned enterprise esOE") 
was composed of profitable business units, unprofitable business 
units, and not-for-profit units. SOE-controlled listed issuers were 
generally IPO carveouts of SOEs' profitable units, with the un-
profitable and not-for-profit units being kept by the parent 
SOEs. 67 Most of the central and local government-controlled 
listed issuers adopt a form of pyramidal structure which does 
not create a divergence between voting rights and cash flow 
rights but which credibly transfers rights in respect of day-to-
day operations to the SOE managers.68 In comparison, private 
64 CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, art. 56. 
65 Id. 
"" For Main Board and SME Board issuers, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, 
CSRC 2006-30: Regulation of Securities Offerings by Listed Issuers, arts. 2--3, 
59, 67 (2006), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2006-05/07/content_27481l.htm [https:/1 
perma.cc/8TA3-S2TD]; CSRC 2006-2, supra note 55, arts. 2, 37, 42--44, 70, 75; 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-303: Form and Contents of Disclosure 
Guide No. 25---Private Placement Memorandum of Listed Issuer, arts. 1, 8 
(2007) (Westlaw China JJlllt (Westlaw China)). For ChiNext Market issuers, see 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2015-123: Regulation oflnitisl Public Offering 
and Listing on ChiNext Market, art. 55 (2016) (Westlaw China JJlllt (Westlaw 
China)); CSRC 2014-28, supra note 55, arts. 7, 74, 96, 101(6); China Sec. Reg. 
Comm'n, CSRC 2014-100: Provisions! Regulation of Offerings by ChiNext Issu-
ers, arts. 2--3, 48, 58 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201 
/201405/t20140529_255116.htm [https://perma.cc/8NWD-6B88]; CSRC 2014-30, 
supra note 55, ch. 2 §§ 6, 10--11; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-31: Form 
and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 36---Private Placement Memorandum of 
ChiNext Issuer, arts. 4(3), 8 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpubliclzjh 
/201406/t20140613_256066.htm [https://perma.cc/4CM9-F7YA]. 
67 See Joseph Abarony, Chi-wen J. Lee & T. J. Wong, Financial Packaging 
of !PO Firms in China, 38 J. AcCT. REs. 103 (2000). 
ss See, e.g., Joseph Fan, T. J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, Institutions and 
Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids, 29 
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entrepreneur-controlled Chinese listed issuers generally come from 
one of three backgrounds: IPOs (close to 50 percent); reverse merg-
ers, generally with poor performing listed issuers (close to 50 per-
cent); and management buyouts or MBOs (a limited few).69 The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange runs a main board; the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange runs a main board, a Small-and-Medium-Sized Enter-
prise esME") board, and a ChiN ext Market for micro issuers. 7o 
Less than 40 percent of the issuers on the two main boards, the 
vast majority of the SME issuers, and nearly all of the ChiN ext 
issuers are private entrepreneur-controlled. 71 All of the private 
entrepreneur-controlled issuers on the SHSE and SZSE's main 
boards, some on the SME board, and few on the ChiNext Market 
adopt pyramiding or cross-holdings ownership structures,72 which 
enhance the ultimate controlling person's share of control (or 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1217, §§ 1, 3.2 (2013); ZHEJIANG GONGSHANG UNN., 
SHANGHAI SUN YAT-SEN UNN. ECON. INST. & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR 
2009-20: STATE ASSETS MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF CEN-
TRAL SOE-CONTROLLED LISTED ISSUERS 21-24, 45--47 (2009), http://www.sse 
.com.cn/researchpublicationsljointresearchlrlplan20100311c.pdf [https://perma 
.crJQU98-XW92]. 
69 See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH INST., SZRI 2008-0160: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEUR-CONTROLLED 
LISTED ISSUERS IN CHINA 13, 23 (2008), http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2008/02 
/25/091811911155.pdf [https://perma.cri664P-WTJ6]; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH. 
RESEARCH CTR., GOVERNANCE STUDY OF THE CHINESE LISTED ISSUERS: PRIVATE 
ENTREPRENEUR-CONTROLLED LISTED ISSUERS 7-8, 21-26 (2005), http://www.sse 
.com.cn/researchpublicationslspeciallrlc_20 120712_91l.shtml [https://perma.cc 
/UZF5-26SX] [hereinafter SHSE, GOVERNANCE STUDY]. Management buyout 
of a large SOE or a listed SOE is prohibited. See State-owned Assets Supervi-
sion and Adm. Comm'n (SASAC) & Ministry of Finance, SASAC 2005-78: Pro-
visional Regulation of Management Buyouts in State-Owned Enterprises, art. 3 
(2005) (Westlaw China 7J1'1! (Westlaw China)). 
70 See Chengxi Yao, Market Structure of the Chinese Equity Markets, 19 
FORDHAMJ. CORP. &FIN. L. 109, §§ B.1, C.1 (2014). 
71 See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH INST., SZRI 2011-0079: A 
COMPARISON OF SME BOARD AND CHINEXT MARKET-CURRENT STATUS AND 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 14-15 (2011); Shanghai Stock Exch. Capital Mkts. 
Research lnst., ¥2012 Corporate Governance Survey Report of SHSE-Listed 
Issuers, SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS, Oct. 23, 2013, at A08. 
72 See SHSE, GOVERNANCE STUDY, supra note 69, ch. 4; Shenzhen Stock 
Exch. Corp. Governance Ctr., ¥2012 Corporate Governance Statistical Report of 
SZSE-Listed Issuers, SEC. DAILY, Aug. 12, 2013, at A12, http://epaper.stcn 
.com/paper/zqsb/page/1/2013-08/12/A012/20130812A012_pdf.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/VZB3-N6Y5]. 
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voting rights) given its share of ownership (or cash flow rights) 
in the listed issuer. 73 
Categorized based on the person ultimately controlling the 
issuer, 74 the largest stockholders of the Chinese listed issuers 
fall among the following six types: central SOE (or central 
government-controlled SOE); local SOE (or local government-
controlled SOE); private entrepreneur; foreign investor; township, 
university, etc.; and hybrid (where the largest stockholder is 
controlled by two or more types of persons). 75 Based on issuers' 
filings as of Q3 2014,76 Table 1 below provides summarized statis-
tics of share concentrations of the largest stockholders of SHSE 
and SZSE listed issuers; Table 2 provides a summary view of such 
issuers' market capitalizations and industry sector distributions. 77 
73 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan & Larry Lang, Disen-
tangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. 
FIN. 2741, 2742-43, 2758 (2002). Cf. supra text accompanying note 68. 
74 For definitions of "controlling shareholder" and "the ultimate controlling 
person of the issuer," see NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2013-8: COMPANY LAW OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CmNA, arts. 216(2)-(3) (2014) (Westlaw China 7Jj$: 
(Westlaw China)). 
75 Cf. China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-98: Form and Contents of Dis-
closure Guide No. 5--Statement of Changes in Issuer Shareholdings (Form 6: 
Categories of Top Ten Shareholders) (2007), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub 
/shenzhenlztzllssgsjgxx/jgfg/ssxxpl/201506/t20150612_279020.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/738B-Q4DC]. 
76 Listed issuers are required to disclose their top ten shareholders' informa-
tion in their annual reports, semi-annual reports, and quarterly reports. See, e.g., 
SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, arts. 66(4)-{5); SC 1993-112, supra note 36, 
art. 59(5); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-40: Listed Issuer Disclosure 
Regulation, arts. 21(3), 22(3) (2007), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/zjhxwfb 
lxwdd/200702/t20070201_68467.html [https://perma.cc/49LD-U9S6]; CSRC 2015-
24, supra note 55, arts. 46, 69; CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, arts. 35(2), 50; 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-23: Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide 
No. 13--Quartsrly Reports, art. 8 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic 
/G00306201/201406/P020140607633786255126.doc [https://perma.cc/W 4X6-NB8F]; 
CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, arts. 38, 48; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55, art. 10. 
77 Issuer data, including ownership, market capitalization, and industry 
sector, were retrieved from the WIND Financial Terminal and processed by the 
Author. Full data are available from the Author. The WIND system is the pre-
mier financial database in China. See WIND INFO. Co., LTD., http://www.wind 
.com.cn [https://perma.cc/LMP 4-R3SX]. 
Table 1 
TYPES AND SlL\REHOLDINGS OF THE LARGii':ST SHARgHOLDERS OF SHSE. A~D SZS:8 LISTED ISSUERS (4~3 201 4) 
Shareholding BracketsO) 
sh::;; 5% 5% < sh::::; 30% 30% < sh <50% sh 2: 50% 
of the Largest Shareholde1·s 
Cen tral SOE: 0 0 99 3.9679%) 130 5.2104%, 106 4.2485'.Vo 3:35 
Local SOE: 1 0.0401% 192 7.69F.·4'!1) 274 10.9820%, 182 7. 2946% 649 
Type of the Priva te Entrepreneur: 
Largest 1,35i) 4 O.HiOB'X. 6Ba 25.3707% 547 21.92:38'){, 171 6.8537%) 
Shareholder; Foreign Investor: 
No. oflssuers 0 0 28 1 .1222% 28 1.1 222% 29 1.1623% 
& %of Total 85 
Township, Univ., etc.: 0 0 BO 1.2021% 14 0.5611%, 2 0.0802%, 46 
Hybrid: 0 0 13 0.5210% 9 0.3607% 3 0.1202% 25 
Total: 5 0.2004% 995 39.879'8% 1002 40. 1603% 493 19.7595% 2,495 Issuers(2>; 100% 
1. Sha re hold i ng brackets ar e set in r efe rence to Ch ina Sec. Reg. Comm·n. CSRC 201 4-108: Regulat ion of Acquisitions of Listed Iss uers (2014); 
C hina Sec. K.eg. Com m'n. , CSRC 201 4--24: Form and Con tents of Disclosure Guide No. I 5----State me nt of C han ges in Kenefi(:ia l Ownershi p of 
Secmit ies (20 14). 
2. Ba sed on issuer filings as of Q3 2014, there were a total of 2 ,60 3 iss uers on t he SHSE a nd SZS E , out of which 108 issuers did not have 


























Issuer Type; INDUSTRY SECTOR(") DISTRIBUTIONS OF SHSE AND SZSE LISTED ISSUERS (Q3 2014) No. ofissucrg;il.J (%; 
Total Mkt Cap (bn Hl\:IB): % A B c D E F G H I J K L l\II N p Q R 
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984; 40.6% 16 42 506 72 :n 74 71 6 23 20 63 13 3 14 1 0 17 
20,575.6 bn RMB; 66% 
Private-Controlled: 
1,355: 55.91Yo 22 26 988 7 ~13 58 8 5 97 ~ ; 55 10 11 1c1 0 4 9 
9,855.7 bn Rl\IIB ; 32% 
Foreign-Controlled: 
85; 3.5%, 0 1 64 0 1 6 0 0 2 0 9 0 0 1 0 0 0 
582.5 bn RMB; 2'};, 
L Of the 2.495 issuers identified in Table 1., seventy-one issuer~ are not contr olled by SOE, Private , or Foreign. This Table thus cover s 2,424 
issuers. 
2. See generally China Sec. Reg. Comm'n., Listed Issuers Categorized by Industry Codes (Q3 2014), ht.t.p:/,'www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/scb 
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Under the Company Law and the Securities Law from their 
initial enactments to their present forms, Chinese regulatory pol-
icy uses the accounting yardsticks of "three consecutive years' 
operating losses" to institute a stock trading suspension and de-
listing in the fourth consecutive loss year, and "three consecutive 
years' operating profits" to grant listed issuers access to the pub-
lic offering markets.7B As evidenced by empirical literature study-
ing the Chinese markets,79 such accounting number-based policy 
has motivated the use of asset exchanges with listed issuers for 
strategic "propping," i.e., provision of financial support by the con-
trolling shareholder to the listed firm today in order to preserve 
its option to expropriate minority shareholders tomorrow (also re-
ferred to as "negative tunneling''). SO The policy has also motivated 
the predatory practice of "tunneling," i.e., siphoning off resources 
from the listed firm by the controlling shareholder through self-
dealing real or financial transactions. BI 
Asset exchanges with listed issuers are regulated under the 
rubric of "Significant Assets Restructuring'' esAR'') by a listed 
78 See, e.g., COMPANY LAW 1994, supra note 38, arts. 137, 152, 157-58; 
SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 49; SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra 
note 45, arts. 55-66; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-1: Regulation of 
Follow-on and Rights Offerings by Listed Issuers, art. 8 (2001) (Westlaw 
China 731$ (Westlaw China)); CSRC 2006-30, supra note 66, art. 7. 
79 See, e.g., In-mu Haw, Daqing Qi, Donghui Wu & Woody Wu, Market Con-
sequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in 
China, 22 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 95 (2005); Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Gov-
ernance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A 
Tunneling Perspective, 13 J. CoRP. FIN. 881 (2007); Guohua Jiang, Charles M.C. 
Lee & Heng Yue, Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The China Ex-
perience, 98J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2010); Winnie Q. Peng, K.C. Wei & Zhishu Yang, 
Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J. 
CORP. FIN. 306 (2011). 
so Eric Friedman, Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Propping and Tunneling, 
31 J. COMP. ECON. 732, 734-35 (2003). 
81 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 22, 22--23 (2000). An example of 
tunneling via real transaction is where an asset is transferred from the firm 
to the controlling shareholder at nonmarket prices. An example of tunneling 
via financial transaction is where the controlling shareholder increases its 
share of the firm through dilutive share issues. !d. at 26. 
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issuer.B2 An SAR is defined to mean asset purchase(s), sale(s), 
and/or other exchange(s) by a listed issuer (including firms con-
trolled by such issuer) when, computed based on the issuer's au-
dited consolidated financial statements of the most recent fiscal 
year, such transactions meet any one of the following three bench-
marks and cause significant changes to the main business, assets, 
and income of the listed issuer: 
(1) the ratio of the gross asset value of the assets pur-
chased and sold by the issuer to the gross assets of 
the issuer is at least 50 percent;Ba 
(2) the ratio of the business income generated in the 
most recent fiscal year by the assets purchased and 
sold by the issuer to the business income of the is-
suer during the same period is at least 50 percent;84 
or 
(3) the ratio of the net asset value of the assets pur-
chased and sold by the issuer to the net assets of 
the issuer is at least 50 percent and such net asset 
value exceeds CN¥50 million.s5 
For the purpose of the SAR definition, "assets" include both "equity 
assets" and "non-equity assets" (such as non-equity financial assets 
and real, or physical, assets). sa 
From the perspective of issuer earnings projections, the char-
acteristics and regulation of SARs have evolved in three stages: 
from the 1990s to the end of 2001 (no earnings projection re-
quirement); from 2002 to November 2014 (across-the-board man-
datory earnings projection requirement); and from November 2014 
onward (across-the-board mandatory MD&A discussion require-
ment and related-party SAR mandatory earnings projection 
requirement). As of the end of 2001, the combination of the IPO 
82 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-109: Regulation of Significant 
Assets Restructuring by Listed Issuers, art. 2 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/20 1410/P020 141024548321879951. pdf [https://perma.cc/3D 
YL-S7JZ]. 
83 Id. art. 12(1). 
B4 Id. art. 12(2). 
85 Id. art. 12(3). 
86 Id. art. 14. 
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quotas and allowance system87 and accounting earnings-based 
delisting and offering access systemBBled to SARs primarily to gain 
listing (of the assets of an unlisted entity which became the con-
trolling shareholder post-transaction, or the unlisted assets of the 
existing controlling shareholder of the listed issuer) via reverse 
merger; to avoid delisting; or to qualify for a follow-on offering.s9 
The SAR activities during this period were regulated in a stop-go 
approach, being perceived by the regulators ambivalently as a 
means to avoid listing standards,90 or as a means to improve listed 
issuers' assets quality.91 No earnings projections were required in 
connection with listed issuer SAR activities.92 
During the second stage beginning in 2002, in response to the 
"related party transactions" ("RPTs"), 93 "controlling shareholder-
issuer business competition,"94 and "restructuring for accounting 
87 See supra Part LA and accompanying notes. 
BB See supra text accompanying note 78. 
89 See, e.g., CHINA SEC. REG. CoMM'N & TX INVEST. CONSULT. Co., LTD., SHJR 
2007-17: NEW APPROACHES TO M&A AND RESTRUCTURING OF LiSTED ISSUERS 
§ 1.1 (2007), http:/lwww.sse.eom.cn/researchpublications/jointresearch/dplan2007 
1227h.pdf [https://perma.cc/94F7-B37W]; XIAO MA, HANDBOOK OF LiSTED COM-
PANY M&A AND RESTRUCTURING RULES AND REGULATIONS §§ 3.1, 4.6 (BEIJING: 
LAW PRESS CHINA 2009). 
oo See, e.g., China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1998-26: Certain Issues Related 
to Assets Exchange and Change of Business by Listed Issuers (1998) (Westlaw 
China 7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)). 
91 See, e.g., China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-75: Standardizing Sig-
nificant Asset Purchases and Sales by Listed Issuers (2000) (Westlaw China 
7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)). 
92 See supra notes 90-91. 
93 "Related party transactions'' or RPTs are defined by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) to mean transfers of resources, services, and/or obligations be-
tween related parties. "Related parties of a firm" include, inter alia, the firm's 
parent, subsidiaries, and companies under the common control with the firm. 
See Ministry of Finance, MOF 2006-3: Enterprise Accounting Principle No. 36: 
Related Party Disclosure (2006) (Westlaw China 7Jj;l! (Westlaw China)). Not 
all RPTs are adverse to the firm interest: RPTs may be means for the control-
ling shareholder (as well as other corporate insiders) to expropriate outside 
shareholders; RPTs may also be a means of efficient contracting. See Michael 
Ryngaert & Shawn Thomas, Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Are 
the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 845 (2012). In this 
Article, RPTs generally refer to the expropriation type. See supra note 79. 
94 "Controlling shareholder-issuer business competition" refers to the 
phenomenon where the controlling shareholder (or its subsidiaries other than 
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cosmetics" or sham restructuring prevalent among SARs,95 the 
CSRC issued an administrative notice mandating earnings pro-
jections by all listed issuers effecting SARs.96 The notice contem-
plated public enforcement for over-projections.97 The penalties for 
ex post over-projections made in connection with an SAR paral-
leled those in connection with stock offerings. as 
The year 2008 saw CSRC's first official rulemaking regulating 
listed issuers' SAR activities: the Regulation of Significant Assets 
Restructuring by Listed Issuers. The regulation set forth an earn-
ings projection policy combining public enforcement with private 
compensation, and designed to prevent overpricing of assets sold 
to listed issuers and underpricing of listed issuers' stocks issued 
to fund the SARs. The policy contained three main components: 
• a mandatory earnings projection requirement; 
• mandatory disclosure of realization-projection com-
parison, and a mandatory private compensation 
scheme; and 
• public enforcement against ex post inaccurate-and 
regulatory reward for ex post accurate--projections.99 
First, the listed issuer must make earnings projections with re-
spect to the assets to be purchased, and to its own firm if it issued 
stock to fund the SAR or if the SAR reached scales requiring ap-
proval by the Listed Issuer M&A and Restructuring Examination 
the listed subsidiary) engage(s) in the same or similar lines of business as, and 
act(s) in competition with, the listed issuer. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n & 
State Econ. & Trade Comm'n, CSRC 2002-1: Governance Principles of Listed 
Issuers, art. 27 (2002) (Westlaw China 7Jf'l! (Westlaw China)). 
95 See supra note 89; see also SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH. RESEARCH. INST., 
SZRI 2010-0064: ASSETS RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES OF SME ISSUERS DURING 
THE 2004--2008 PERIOD: CHARACTERISTICS, ISSUES, AND POIJCY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 36--37 (2010). 
96 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-105: Certain Issues Related to 
Significant Asset Purchases, Sales, and Exchanges by Listed Issuers, app. art. 
5(1) (2002) (Westlaw China 7Jf'l! (Westlaw China)). 
97 !d. art. 15. 
ss Id. See also CSRC 2001-1, supra note 78, art. 32; see supra text accom-
panying notes 64--66. 
99 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2008-53: Regulation of Significant Assets 
Restructuring by Listed Issuers (2008) (W estlaw China 7Jf'l! (W estlaw China)) 
[hereinafter SAR Regulation 2008]. 
486 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
and Verification Committee ('SAR E&V Committee"). lOU All earn-
ings projections must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.lol 
If the issuer was unable to make the required projections, it must 
show the reason thereof, release a Special Risk Factor Statement, 
and provide an MD&A discussion in the SAR Report in lieu of 
earnings projections.1o2 
Second, in its annual reports for three years following an SAR, 
the issuer must provide computations of any disparities between 
projected earnings and realized earnings, pertaining to the pur-
chased assets and to its own firm separately. loa All such computa-
tions must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.l04 For the 
SAR completion year and the following year, the independent fi-
nancial advisor retained by the issuer for the SAR transaction 
must publish a Post-SAR Continuous Supervision and Guidance 
Annual Opinion comparing projected earnings with realized earn-
ings, and comparing the issuer's MD&A discussion in the SAR 
Report with its actual results of operations.105 To the extent that 
realized earnings fell short of the projected earnings pertaining to 
the purchased assets, the SAR counterpart must compensate the 
listed issuer_106 
Third, in the case of an over-projection by 20 percent or more, 
or if actual results of operations were substantially inferior to the 
MD &A discussion, the chairman and the general manager of the 
issuer, as well as the intermediaries participating in the SAR 
(such as the accounting firm, the independent financial advisor 
and the assets appraisal firm, and their staff involved in the SAR 
100 Id. art. 17, 27. The SAR E&V Committee was established by the CSRC in 
2004. See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2004-41: Charter of Listed Issuer 
Restructuring Examination and Verification Committee (2004) (Westlaw China 
)Jj$ (Westlaw China)). For its current functions, see China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, 
CSRC 2014-15: Charter of Listed Issuer M&A and Restructuring Examination 
and Verification Committee (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/GOO 
306201/20 1405/t20 140509_2487 4l.htm. [https://perma.cc/V7RR-CDVD]. 
101 CSRC 2008-53, supra note 99, art. 17. 
102 Id. 
10s Id. art. 33. 
104 Id. 
10s Id. art. 15, 36. 
100 Id. art. 33. 
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transaction) must all make apologies to investors in the CSRC-
designated media_107 If the over-projection reached 50 percent, 
all the preceding parties could additionally be subject to CSRC's 
"regulatory measures." lOB Actual meting out of the penalties was 
subject to an undefined force majeure exception_109 On the other 
hand, if the realized earnings post-SAR pertaining to the issuer 
and the purchased assets met their respective projected earnings, 
the CSRC would allow the issuer to use pro formauo accounting 
earnings for the issuer's pre-SAR period in qualifying for a post-
SAR public offering.m 
101 Id. art. 54. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. art. 8, 54. A sample study of twenty-seven group companies listed 
via merging the unlisted parent with the listed subsidiary as of June 2009 
found that fifteen out of the twenty-seven listed group companies did 
not meet their earnings projections made in connection with the SARs. See 
Fu!>AN UNN. & SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHJR 2009-20: GROUP COMPANY 
LISTINGS AND ISSUER PERFORMANCES§§ 2.4, 6.1 (2009), http://www.sse.com.cn 
/researchpublications/jointresearchlc/plan20 100311a. pdf [https://perma.cc 
N9CL-6LRF]. 
no Neither the CSRC, nor the Chinese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (CICPA), nor the latter's regulator the Ministry of Finance has 
adopted any rule or standard governing pro forma financial information. Cf. 
Pro Forma Financial Information, 17 C.F.R. § 210.11 (2016); AICPA, REPORT-
ING ON PRO FORMA FINANCIAL INFORMATION, SSAE No. 10 (2001), http://www 
.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AT-004 
Ol.pdf [https://perma.cc/F63D-6U6Q]. "Pro forma financial information" in Reg-
ulation S-X is to be distinguished from "non-GAAP financial measures" tar-
geted by Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The former is intended to 
depict the continuing impact of an actual or proposed transaction on the his-
torical GAAP financial statements, and shows the specific adjustments that 
would have been required by GAAP had the transaction occurred at an ear-
lier time, and ending with the pro forma statements. The latter refers to fi-
nancial information calculated and presented on the basis of methodologies 
other than in accordance with GAAP, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act sought to 
eliminate manipulative or misleading use of non-GAAP financial measures. 
See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Financial Reporting 
Release No. 65, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820, 4820-21 n.12 (2003); Conditions for Use of 
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8145, Exchange 
Act Release No. 46,788, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,790, 68,791 n.12 (2002). 
m CSRC 2008-53, supra note 99, art. 4 7. See also supra text accompanying 
note 78. The CSRC's 2011 and 2013 amendments to the SAR Regulation have re-
tained the 2008 earnings projection policy, except that where an SAR results 
in a "back-door listing," the independent financial advisor must publish its 
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The third stage is preceded by China's Twelfth Five-Year 
(2011-2015) Plan for National Economic and Social Developments, 
which envisions group listings of large SOEs, 112 as opposed to 
IPO carveout listings.J13 This stage of SAR characteristics and 
regulation is guided by the State Council's emphasis on SARs as 
important means of resource allocation by the capital markets, 
and on the increased role of the market in SAR regulation.114 In 
2014, the CSRC reoriented its SAR regulation. It set the primacy 
of issuer MD&A discussion over issuer earnings projections, 
noting "the inherent unreliability of earnings projections." liS It 
Post-BAR Annual Opinion for three years. The 2011 amendment defines a 
"back-door listing'' as an BAR in which the ratio of the gross asset value of 
the assets purchased by the listed issuer to the gross assets of the issuer as 
reported in its audited consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the change in control of the listed issuer is at least 
100 percent. The 2013 amendment subjects back-door listing candidates to 
the same financial standards applicable to IPO candidates "to prevent regu-
latory arbitrage between IPO regulation and back-door listing regulation, and 
to prevent avoidance of the delisting system." See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, 
CSRC 2011-73: Regulation of Significant Assets Restructuring by Listed 
Issuers, arts. 12, 36--37 (2011), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz 
/ssl/201310/t20131016_23631l.html [https://perma.cc/8QTP-R6PA]; China Sec. 
Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2013-61: Notice of Equal Examination and Verification 
Standards Applicable to IPO Listing and Back-Door Listing Applicants (2013), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfglbmgf/ssgslbgcz/201402/t20140218 
_243967 .html [https://perma.cc/Q73C-W JAF]. 
112 See STATE COUNCIL, TwELFrH FIVE-YEAR (20 11-2015) PLAN FOR NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC AND SoCIALDEVEWPMENTS § 45.1 (2011), http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11 
2934 72/n 11293832/n13095885/13617181.html [https://perma.cc/8L29-NUSG]; 
see also NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., NPC 2011-X: RESOLUTION APPROVING STATE 
COUNCIL'S TwELFTH FIVE-YEAR (2011-2015) PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL DEVEWPMENTS (2011) (Westlaw China 711$ (Westlaw China)); 
Chinese Communist Party Cent. Comm., CCPCC 2010-X: Recommendation 
for the Formulation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Developments (2010) (Westlaw China 711$ (Westlaw China)). 
113 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
114 See State Council, SC 2014-14: Opinion on Further Improving Regulatory 
Environment for Corporate Restructuring, '1['1[1.2, 3.6 (2014), http://www.gov.cn 
/zhengce/content/2014-03/24/content_8721.htm [https://perma.cc/8TTQ-L5QW]; 
State Council, SC 2014-17: On Further Facilitating Healthy Development of 
the Capital Markets, '1['1[1.1-1.2, 2.7 (2014) http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content 
/2014-05/09/content_8798.htm [https://perma.cc/97SD-EYKC]. 
116 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-109p: Explanatory Notes to 
Proposed Amendment of Regulation of Significant Assets Restructuring by 
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differentiated between an issuer SAR with its controlling share-
holder and an arm's-length SAR, noting "the inherent market 
forces in play" in the latter.116 Compared with the SAR Regula-
tion (2008),117 the current SAR Regulation (2014) has these 
three features: 
• mandatory MD&A discussion for all SARs, and 
voluntary earnings projections permitted; 
• mandatory projection disclosure and mandatory 
compensation scheme for related-party SARs; and 
• public enforcement against ex post inaccurate-
and regulatory reward for ex post accurate-
projections.UB 
First, a listed issuer effecting an SAR must provide an MD&A 
in the SAR Report, discussing the impact of the SAR on its con-
tinued operating ability, its future prospects, its earnings per 
share in the SAR year, and other financial and non-financial 
benchmarks.119 The issuer may make earnings projections which, 
if made, must be attested by a qualified accounting firm.12o 
Second, if an issuer effects an SAR with its controlling 
shareholder (or a related party of the latter) or with a party who 
becomes the controlling shareholder post-SAR, and the SAR pric-
ing is based on earnings projections, then for three years post-SAR 
the issuer must disclose an annual computation of any disparities 
between projected earnings and realized earnings pertaining to 
the assets purchased.121 Such computation must be attested by a 
qualified accounting firm and published in the issuer's annual 
report. 122 To the extent that realized earnings fall short of 
the projected earnings, the related-party SAR counterpart must 
Listed Issuers, § 2.5 (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/G00306201 
/20 1407/P020 14071153456531966l.doc [https://perma.cc/4PU 4-DSUS]. 
11a Id. § 2.6. 
117 See supra text accompanying note 99. 
118 See CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82. 
119 Id. art. 19. 
120 Id. art. 22. 
121 Id. art. 35. 
122 Id. 
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compensate the listed issuer. 123 To the extent that the SAR 
transaction dilutes the earnings per share of the issuer in the 
SAR year, the SAR counterpart must undertake to make the 
issuer whole_l24 
In contrast, if the issuer effects an SAR with a non-related 
party and the SAR does not result in a change in control of the 
issuer, the ex post comparison and compensation requirements 
do not apply. The exemption is based on the rationale that the 
negotiation process of a non-related party SAR is subject to 
market forces, and that the assets purchased by the listed issuer 
in the SAR have since been operated by it and are no longer 
under the control of the non-related SAR counterpart.125 
Regardless of related party or non-related party SAR, the in-
dependent financial advisor to the listed issuer SAR transaction 
must, fur four years in the case of an SAR resulting in a ''back-door 
listing''126 and two years otherwise, publish a Post-SAR Continu-
ous Supervision and Guidance Annual Opinion, comparing pro-
jected earnings with realized earnings, and the issuer's MD&A 
discussion with actual results of operations.127 
Third, the SAR Regulation (2014) has left intact the SAR 
Regulation (2008)'s carrot and stick policies for accurate projec-
tions and over-projections.12s 
C. Issuer Periodic and Current Reporting and Earnings 
(Forecast) Disclosure 
Listed issuers began to be subject to annual, semi-annual, and 
current reporting requirements in 1993.129In 2001, motivated by 
12a Id. 
12• Id. 
126 Id. See also CSRC Q&A's with Press Regarding SAR Regulation Amend-




• For the definition of an BAR resulting in a "back-door listing," see supra 
note 111. 
127 CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82, art. 38. 
128 Id. arts. 51, 59. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-11. 
129 See State Council, SC 1993-112, supra note 36, art. 57; China Sec. Reg. 
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the need for enhanced market transparency with respect to issuers 
facing delisting risks, the CSRC added a quarterly reporting re-
quirement across the board for all listed issuers.J30 To complement 
the periodic and current reporting system for historical infor-
mation, the CSRC and the stock exchanges set a bifurcated 
mandatory/voluntary disclosure regime for earnings forecasts, 
which evolved from annual earnings projections in 1994131 to semi-
annual and quarterly earnings forecasts beginning in 2002.132 
The current mandatory/voluntary bifurcated periodic earnings 
forecast system is administered by the CSRC and the stock ex-
changes according to their respective jurisdictions, and regulates 
the following three types of information: 
• annual earnings projections: voluntary disclosure 
subject to a duty to update; 
• periodic earnings projections: mandatory for ex-
change-designated issuers; and 
• earnings preannouncements: voluntary, generally. 
Comm'n, CSRC 1993-43: Listed Company Disclosure Rules (Provisional), art. 4 
(1993) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)). 
"" See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2000-63: Notice Concenring Enhanced 
Disclosure Requirement for ST and PI' Issuers (2000) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: 
(Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2001-55: Form and Contents 
of Disclosure Guide No. 13--Quarterly Reports (2001) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: 
(Westlaw China)). 
131 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1994-7: Form and Contents of Dis-
closure Guide No. 2---Annual Report (Provisional), § 2.5 (1994) (Westlaw 
China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)) (annual earnings projections voluntary); cf. 
China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 1998-148: Notice Concerning 1998 Annual 
Report, art. 2 (1998) (Westlaw China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)) (annual earnings 
projections mandatory for loss issuers). 
'"
2 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2002-44: Form and Contents of 
Disclosure Guide No. 3---Semi-Annual Report, art. 35 (2002) (Westlaw China 
7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)); China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2002-X: Form and Con-
tents of Disclosure Guide No. 13--Quarterly Reports, art. 12 (2002) (Westlaw 
China 7Jjll!: (Westlaw China)); see also SHANGHAI STOCKEXCH., SHSE 2004-X: 
SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6.4 (2004) (Westlaw 
China 7J jll!: (Westlaw China)); SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2004-107: 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LiSTING RULES, arts. 6.4--6.5 (2004) http:// 
www.szse.cn/UpFiles/Attach/1412/2004/12/0311611010156.doc [https://perma.cc 
/GPF8-VEKR]. 
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In connection with the filing of its annual report, an issuer 
may make annual earnings projections for the forthcoming year, 
and disclose them in the current year's annual report. If an issuer 
chooses to do so, it must have its earnings projections attested 
by a qualified public accounting firm.taa The issuer becomes under 
a duty to "timely'' (undefined by rule) disclose any "material up-
date" (undefined by rule) to its earlier earnings projections, by 
filing a current report with the listing stock exchange.134 The 
issuer triggers a further duty to analyze any "material disparity'' 
(defined by rule to mean a threshold 20 percent ex post forecast 
error in either direction) between its projected earnings and 
realized earnings, and to disclose such material disparity and its 
analysis in the following year's annual report.135 
In connection with the filing of a periodic report, an issuer 
must136 disclose its projected cumulative earnings from the be-
ginning of the year through the end of the next reporting period 
("Projection Period") 137 if it hits any of the following three 
benchmarks ("Benchmark Issuer''): 
133 See China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2007-212: Form and Contents of 
Disclosure Guide No. 2--Annual Report, art. 33(2) (2007) (Westlaw China 7J:f$ 
(Westlaw China)). 
134 See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2014-65: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE 
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 11.3. 7 (2014), http://www.sse.eom.cn/lawandrules 
/sserulesllisting/stockla/20141019/0c66952a92b51b909f3d7516f52f9778.doc 
[https://perma.cc/LW77-5CDJ]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2014-378: 





IHS6A-QW6N]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2014-378-C: SHENZHEN STOCK 






136 See CSRC 2015-24, supra note 55, arts. 28(3), 30. 
136 Different treatments between the SHSE and the SZSE are discussed in 
Part II.A, infra. 
137 Where the periodic report is the annual report, the Projection Period shall 
be the first quarter of the year following the year covered by the annual report. 
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(1) the issuer projects an earnings loss for the projec-
tion period; 
(2) the issuer projects an earnings turnaround from the 
year-to-date loss reported in the periodic report, or 
from the earnings loss reported for the same period 
the previous year; or 
(3) the issuer's projected earnings represent a threshold 
50 percent increase or decrease compared to the 
earnings reported for the same period the pre-
vious year.13B 
493 
The mandatory forecast must be concurrently disclosed in the 
periodic report filed with the CSRC and repeated in a current 
report filed with the issuer's stock listing exchange_139 
Ex ante, issuers must assure and expressly represent that their 
earnings forecasts are "accurate" and "objective," or caution to 
the contrary.I40 Issuers shall have a duty to "timely'' disclose any 
"substantial update" to their previous forecast, and offer a public 
apology for the revision.141 An issuer predicting a third-year 
See SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2010-X: FORMS AND CONTENTS OF DISCW-
SURE GUIDE No. 22--EARNINGS ESTIMATES AND PRELIMINARY EARNINGS AN-
NOUNCEMENTS AND REVISIONS THEREOF (2014); cf. SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., 
SHSE 2013-X: FORMS AND CONTENTS OF DISCWSURE GUIDE No. 1-CURRENT 
REPORTS, ITEMS Nos. 27-30 (2013) (imposing no forecasting requirement in 
connection with the annual report filing), http://www.sse.com.cnllawandrules 
/guide/disclosure/dailymemo/dc_20130726_3728716.shtml [https://perma.cc/DZ 
7V-ELK8]. 
138 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76, 
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55, 
art. 17. The SHSE only requires the Benchmark Issuers to make annual earn-
ings projections, whereas the SZSE requires the Benchmark Issuers to make 
quarterly, as well as annual, earnings projections. C<Jmpare SHSE 2014-65, 
supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, with SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, 
and SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1. 
1so Id. 
140 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2, 2.6; SZSE 2014-378, supra 
note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2, 2.5; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 2.1-2.2, 
2.4. A sample review of issuer earnings forecast releases for FY 2013 shows 
that issuers generally provided the standard affirmative representations. 
141 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 13.3.3; SZSE 2014-378, supra 
note 134, arts. 11.3.3--11.3.5; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 11.3.4-
11.3.6. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges' rules appear to fail to 
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earnings loss after having suffered two consecutive years' losses 
must repeat its negative predictions together with a "Trading 
Suspension Risk Warning'' at least three times before its third-
year annual report filing date. An issuer predicting a fourth-year 
earnings loss after having suffered three consecutive years' losses 
must disclose its negative predictions together with a "Stock De-
listing Risk Warning'' prior to the tenth day after the end of the 
fourth year.I42 Loss issuers on SZSE's ChiNext Market are re-
quired to disclose their earnings forecasts and suspension and 
delisting risk warnings much earlier and with greater frequency 
than their main board and SME board counterparts.I43 
Different from the mandatory forecasting regime for Bench-
mark Issuers, any issuer may release a preliminary earnings an-
nouncement after the end of a reporting period but before the 
filing of the periodic report. Such an earnings preannouncement 
must include at a minimum all of the following nine items 
for both the reporting period and the same period the year be-
fore, presented in a comparative format: (1) business income; 
(2) business profits; (3) gross profits; (4) net profits; (5) gross assets; 
(6) net assets; (7) earnings per share; (8) net assets per share; 
and (9) return on equity.I44 The voluntary discloser must assure 
that there is no material disparity between its preliminary earn-
ings announcement and the final periodic report. In the event of 
a threshold 20 percent disparity in either direction, the issuer 
must issue a public apology simultaneously with its filing of the 
periodic report.J45 
The idea for a preliminary earnings announcement originated 
in 2000, when the stock exchanges informally required issuers to 
release an advance, unaudited version of their annual financial 
statements if the information had been leaked pending the filing 
distinguish between a "correction'' and an "update." See Stransky v. Cummins 
Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331--32 (7th Cir. 1995). 
142 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, arts. 14.1.2, 14.3.2; SZSE 2014-378, 
supra note 134, arts. 14.1.8, 14.4.4. 
143 SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, arts. 13.1.2, 13.4.2. 
144 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.5; SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, 
art. 11.3.6; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3. 7. 
146 SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.6; SZSE 2014-378, supra 
note 134, art. 11.3. 7; SZSE 2014-378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.8. 
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of the audited annual report.146 In 2004, the stock exchanges' 
listing rules imposed such a leak-triggered disclosure obligation 
in connection with all periodic reports.t47 Since 2006, the stock ex-
changes started using the term "preliminary earnings announce-
ment" (kuai bao) as a mandatory mechanism where the financial 
information has been leaked, and voluntary otherwise.t4B 
Tables 3 through 5 below provide a summary view of the timing, 
reliability, and complementarity of issuer earnings forecasts 
made under the mandatory regime and issuer earnings prean-
nouncements made under the voluntary regime for FY 2013 
earnings. The list of 2,489 issuers included in the analysis repre-
sents all issuers listed on the SHSE and SZSE at the end of Q4 
2013, based on the CSRC published data esample Issuers").t49 
Financial data are based on issuer filings retrieved from the WIND 
Financial Terminal and processed by the Author. 150 "Reliability" 
146 See SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2000-Y: NOTICE REGARDING YEAR 
2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (Westlaw China li ~ (Westlaw China)); 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2000-Y: NOTICE REGARDING YEAR 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT (2000) (Westlaw China li~ (Westlaw China)). 
147 SHSE 2004-X, supra note 132, art. 6. 7; SZSE 2004-107, supra note 132, 
art. 6.8. 
148 SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2006-X: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE 
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6. 7, § 11.3 (2006) (Westlaw China lJ~ (Westlaw 
China)); SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2006-X: SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE 
STOCK LISTING RULES, art. 6. 7, § 11.3 (2006) (Westlaw China lJ~ (Westlaw 
China)). See also SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 6.7, § 11.3; SZSE 2014-378, 
supra note 134, art. 6.9, § 11.3. 
149 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, Listed Issuers Categorized by Industry Codes 
(Q4 2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/newsite/scb/ssgshyfljg/201401/W02014 
0102326518754522.pdf [https://perma.cc/M76M-KWK8]. 
""Mandatory annual earnings forecasts for FY 2013 are based on Sample 
Issuers' Q3 2013 periodic reports and current reports filed in or after October 
2013. Some of the sample forecasts may not strictly have triggered the Bench-
marks (see supra note 138 and accompanying text), but were nevertheless issued 
under the mandatory regime. Only quantitative (i.e., point, range, and a few 
open-ended) forecasts were included in the analysis; qualitative forecasts 
were excluded. See Yongtae Kim, Michael Lacina & Myung Seok Park, Posi-
tive and Negative Information Transfers from Management Forecasts, 46 J. 
ACCT. RES. 885, 889 n.3, 892 (2008). Voluntary annual earnings preannounce-
ments are those filed by Sample Issuers preceding their audited 2013 annual 
reports. Actual, reported 2013 annual earnings are from Sample Issuers' au-
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FE* ,= 0 
20%:::1 FE I< I0%:::1 FE I< I FJ•; I < 10% 50~!{) 20% 
f).OOOO% 6.2755~~ 11.9898% 0 
0 0.1C20% 0.2041% 0 
0.0510% 0.1531% 0.5612~~{) 0 
99 128 250 
5.0510% 6.5306% 12.7551% 0 
:3.6735% 5.3G6Bii 20.7653% 0.0510% 
0.1581% O.OnlO%) 0.3061'.Vo 0 
0.0510% 0 0.1531% 0.0510% 
0.0510% 0.1C20% 0.2551% 0 
0 0 0.0510% 0 
77 107 422 2 
3.9286% 5.4592% 21.5306% 0.102:0% 
8.9796% 11.9898% 34.2857% 0.102:0% 
1. Total number of iswers: 2,489. Number of issuers disdo:~ing mandatory forecasts: 1. 722. 
2. Total number of forecasts: 2,139. Number of quant itative forecasts: 1,960. 
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0.0510% 0.1020% 0 0.0510% 
0.30ti1%, 0 0.1020% 0 
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18.214;3% 1.88/'8% 1.0714% 0.765:3% 
0.2551'_!1() 0 0 0 
0.2551% 0 0.0510% 0 
0.2551% 0 0 0 
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& %of Total; 
VOLU~TARY ANNUAL EARNINGS PREANNOU~CEMENTS BY SHSE Al\D SZSE LISTED ISSUERS FOR FY 2013 
BASED ON ISSUER PREANNOU~CE:V!E~S RELEASED PRIOR TO THEIR AUDITED 2013 ANNUAL REPORT FILI~GS 
PE* < 0 (Audited earnings are less than preannounced PE* > 0 (Audited earnings are greater than pre-
earnings) PE"k=O announced earnin~s) 
I PEl:;> 50%, 20%~ I PEl 10%~ IPEI I PE l < 10%, PE < 10% IO%~PE< 20% :s PE< PE :;>50% Timing ofPA's <50% <20% 20% 50%, 
Jan 2014 0.0801% 0 0.1601% 5.6845% 0.6405% ·1.4836% O.OSOl% 
Feb 2014 1.:3611% 0.4003% 3.0424% :35.2282% 11.529:~% 2:U:385% 0.5604% 
Mar 2014 0 () ().()801% 1.4412'% 2.5G20{% 0.8807'){, 0 
Apt 2014 0 0.0801% 0.2402% 0 .8807'!1) 4.9640% 2.2418% 0.0801')';, 
Total 18 6 44 540 246 384 9 
1,249; 100% 1.4412% 0.4804% 3.5228% 43.2346% 19.6958% 30.7446% 0.7206% 
*PA: Preannouncement. *PE: Preannouncement Error 
NOTES: 
1. Total number of issuers: 2,489. Number of issuers disclosing voluntary preannounce ments: 1,202. 
2. Total number ofpreannouncements: 1,249. 
Table 5 
Mandatory Forecast Only: 
664; 26.68% 
NUI\UlERS AND PEECENTAGES OF ISSUERS DISCLOSING 2013 ANNUAL 
MANDATORY F..ARNINGS FORECASTS AND/OR VOLU>ITARY EARNINGS PREAN>IOUNCEMENTS 
Total Number ofissuers Listed on the SHSE and SZSF; as of Q4 2013: 2,489;* 100% 
.1\landatory Forecast and cuuto•y P•:•nnu"~&' Only Voluntary Pre announce: 
1,058; 42.51% 







Neither Mandatory Forecast 
Nor Voluntary Prcannounce: 
623; 25.03% 
*Source: CSRC. LISTED ISSUERS CATEGORIZED 13Y INDUSTHY CODES (Q4 2012:), http://www.csr·c.gov.cn/pub/newsitelscb/ssgshyfljg/201401/\N020140 
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II. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
REPORTING AND PROJECTIONS 
499 
A. Constructing an Integrated Issuer Historical and Forward-
Looking Disclosure System 
Fragmented, incoherent, and sometimes contradictory regula-
tory rubrics currently govern issuer periodic and current reports 
(including mandatory earnings projections and voluntary earnings 
preannouncements), while the Listed Issuer Disclosure Regula-
tion adopted by the CSRC in 2007 provides principles governing 
listed issuers' offering and listing documentation, and periodic and 
current reporting.I53 "Annual reports'' and "semi-annual reports" 
have been mandated since 1993 by the State Council's Provisional 
Regulation of Securities Offerings and Trading, and since 1999 by 
the Securities Law. Their forms and contents have been stan-
dardized since 1994 by the CSRC Disclosure Guide for Annual 
Report and CSRC Disclosure Guide for Semi-Annual Report.I54 
"Quarterly reports" have been required since 2001 by the CSRC 
Disclosure Guide for Quarterly Reports, but they are neither con-
templated by the State Council's Provisional Regulation nor man-
dated by the Securities Law.I55 The concept of "current reports" 
originated in the 1993 State Council's Provisional Regulation. 
The term "current reports" first appeared in 1998 in the stock 
exchanges' listing rules, and since 1999 has also appeared in the 
Securities Law.I56 The list of "material events" within the scope 
of current reports has been set in the Securities Law since 1999 
153 CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, art. 5. 
154 SC 1993·112, supra note 36, ch. 6; SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, 
§ 3.3; CSRC 1994·7, supra note 131; China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CRSC 1994·87: 
Form and Contents of Disclosure Guide No. 3--Semi-Annual Report (Provisional) 
(1994) (Westlaw China 711'1!: (Westlaw China)). 
155 CSRC 2001·55, supra note 130; c{. SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, 
§ 3.3; SC 1993·112, supra note 36, ch. 6. 
156 See, e.g., SC 1993·112, supra note 36, art. 60; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., 
CSRC 1997·22: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LiSTING RULES, ch. 7 (1998) 
(Westlaw China 711'1!: (Westlaw China)); SHENZHEN STOCKEXCH., CSRC 1997·23: 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE STOCK LISTING RULES, ch. 7 (1998) (Westlaw China 
711'1!: (Westlaw China)); SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 62. 
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with little change over the years.t57 The forms and contents of 
current reports are specified by each of the stock exchanges ac-
cording to their respective standards, !58 and there is no CSRC 
disclosure guide for current reports_159 
Issuer earnings projections are governed, separately, by the 
CSRC's disclosure guides for periodic reports, and by the stock 
exchanges' listing rules and disclosure guides for current reports. 
Under the rubric of periodic reporting regulation, the CSRC 
mandates that Benchmark Issuers project their earnings ex ante 
for the projection period_l60 Conversely, under the rubric of current 
reporting regulation, the stock exchanges allow Benchmark Is-
suers to "project" earnings ex post, i.e., after the end of the relevant 
accounting period.t61 The CSRC requires that earnings forecasts 
by Benchmark Issuers be made progressively for six-month, 
three-quarter, and one-year forecasting periods, to which the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange rules adhere. In contrast, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange rules cut down the three mandatory progressive 
forecasting periods to a one-year forecasting period, and leave 
the semi-annual and quarterly earnings forecasts to the discretion 
of the Benchmark Issuers.162 Under both stock exchanges' rules, 
157 See, e.g., SECURITIES LAw 1999, supra note 42, art. 62 (listing eleven 
"material events"); SECURITIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, art. 67 (adding one 
more "material event" to the 1999 list); cf CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, art. 30 
(exercising authority delegated by the Securities Law and expanding the list 
into twenty-one "material events"). 
1
'" Compare SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, chs. 7-11, and SHSE 2013-X, 
supra note 137, with SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, chs. 7-11, and SZSE 
2010-X, supra note 137. 
159 See CSRC 2007-40, supra note 76, ch. 4; cf id. ch. 3, art. 29. 
160 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76, 
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55, 
art. 17. 
161 See SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1; SZSE 2010-X, supra 
note 137, art. 2. 
162 See CSRC 2014-22, supra note 55, art. 20; CSRC 2014-23, supra note 76, 
art. 12; CSRC 2013-29, supra note 55, art. 26; CSRC 2013-21, supra note 55, 
art. 17. Compare SZSE 2014-378, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, and SZSE 2014-
378-C, supra note 134, art. 11.3.1, with SHSE 2014-65, supra note 134, art. 
11.3.1. This Article does not engage in the current debate in the United States 
concerning the advisability of management quarterly earnings guidance. Com-
pare Leo E. Strine, Jr., 'lbward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflec-
tions on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational 
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Benchmark Issuers, whose risk of negative earnings or earnings 
volatility underlies the mandatory disclosure regime, need only 
disclose "earnings," whereas non-Benchmark Issuers must disclose, 
once they voluntarily undertake to preannounce, a whole range 
of balance sheet and income statement items.tsa 
This Article recommends an integrated issuer disclosure and 
reporting system for Chinese issuers under the Securities Law,t64 
by expanding and reconstructing the CSRC's Listed Issuer Dis-
closure Regulation into a central disclosure repository and oper-
ational mechanism and benefiting from the philosophy of SEC 
Regulation S-K.165 Whereas Regulation S-K streamlined the two 
distinct disclosure systems (under the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act respectively) to achieve disclosure efficiency, this 
Article recommends streamlining the two bifurcated jurisdictions 
(over periodic reports by the CSRC and over current reports by the 
stock exchanges respectively) to achieve efficient and equitable 
regulation. 166 Specifically, all periodic and current reports should 
System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, § II.A.7 (2008) (advocating 
prohibition of management quarterly earnings estimates, claiming that such 
estimates provide little value to investors but manage to the market), with 
Joel F. Houston, Baruch Lev & Jennifer Tucker, To Guide or Not to Guide? 
Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance, 27 
CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 143, 178-79 (20 10) (documenting poor operating perfor-
mance as a major motive for, and a deterioration in the information environ-
ment as a consequence of, quarterly guidance cessation), and Shuping Chen, 
Dawn Matsumoto & Shiva Rajgopal, Is Silence Golden? An Empirical Analysis 
of Firms That Stop Giving Quarterly Earnings Guidance, 51 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 
134, 139 (2011) (documenting a similar finding). Instead, this Article discusses 
the unequal mandatory forecasting periods imposed on issuers by China's two 
stock exchanges respectively. 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 136--38, 144. 
164 In contrast to the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, which govern primary markets and secondary markets respectively, 
the Chinese Securities Law governs both primary and secondary markets in a 
single statute. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. 
L. REV. 1340, 1340-42 (1966); Yao, supra note 70, at 191. 
165 Regulation S-K is the repository for filing instructions for non-financial 
disclosures made under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See gener-
ally 17 C.F.R. 229 (2016); Adoption oflntegrated Disclosure System, Securities 
Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 4 7 Fed. Reg. 11,380 
(Mar. 16, 1982). 
166 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 139, 161-62. 
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be authorized by the Securities Law of the People's Republic of 
China, with rulemaking authority related thereto granted to the 
CSRC.167 The CSRC should prescribe uniform forms and line 
items for all periodic and current reports. 168 Such a CSRC-
administered mandatory disclosure system should facilitate a level 
playing field-with respect to mandatory projections 169 -for 
issuers listed on the SZSE, which features private entrepreneur-
controlled issuers, and issuers listed on the SHSE, which fea-
tures state-controlled issuers.170 
It further recommends integrating issuer earnings projections 
into such a CSRC-administered public disclosure system. Three 
disclosure policies should be addressed. First, "projection" (and 
similar terms) should be rigorously defined. Academic literature, 
as well as the accounting profession and securities regulators in 
the United States,171 does not treat as "projections" management's 
earnings disclosure issued after the end of the fiscal period and 
before the filing of a formal periodic report. A bright line must be 
drawn between the mandatory "earnings forecast" by a Bench-
mark Issuer (yu gao), 172 and the voluntary "earnings preannounce-
ment" by any issuer (kuai bao).l73 An earnings "forecast" is a 
167 Cf. 15 U.S. C. §§ 78m(a)-(b)(1) (2012) (requiring listed issuers to file 
periodic and other reports with the Commission, and authorizing the Commis-
sion to prescribe forms and line items for such reports). 
168 Cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 13a-ll, 13a-13 (2016) (requiring the filing of 
annual reports, current reports, and quarterly reports); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308, 
308a, 310 (2016) (requiring the use of Form 8-K, Form 10-Q, and Form 10-K for 
filing current reports, quarterly reports, and annual reports); SEC, EXCHANGE 
Acr FORMS, http:l/www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfinlformslexchange.shtml [https:l/ 
perma.ccfl'3PJ-5WUK] (setting forth filing instructions and line items for the 
forms to be filed under the Exchange Act). 
169 Disclosures by one firm can generate externalities to other firms. See 
Ronald A Dye, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Discwsures: 'I'M Cases of Financial 
and Real Externalities, 65 ACCT. REV. 1, 19--20 (1990). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 71, 162. 
171 See, e.g., Rowland K Atiase, Haidan Li, Somchai Supattarakul & Senyo 
Tse, Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals: Earnings 
Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance, 10 REv. Accr. STUD. 497, 522 
n.12 (2005); AI CPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, 
§ 301.08; Future Economic Performance Projections, Securities Act Release 
No. 5581, Exchange Act Release No. 11,374, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,316, 20,317, 20,323 
(May 9, 1975). 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 136--39. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 144-48. 
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prediction of "future" earnings, and thus must have a "forecast 
horizon" or the number of calendar days between the forecasting 
date and the end of the forecast period. A "forecast period" in turn 
refers to the time period covered by a forecast and may be par-
tially expired by the forecasting date.I74 An earnings "prean-
nouncement" is an early announcement of "historical" earnings, 
i.e., a tentative report made after the end of an accounting pe-
riod but shortly before the release of the formal report.J75 
Second, a fair and transparent presentation format should be 
prescribed for mandatory earnings projections. In particular, any 
government subsidy should be separately disclosed, both in fore-
casted and reported earnings.I76 Economic models and empirical 
literature demonstrate that investors rely on management earn-
ings forecasts and reported earnings to draw inferences about the 
level and riskiness of the firm value; managers thus have incen-
tives to manage reported earnings upward toward their forecasts 
so as to influence investors' perceptions and to avoid reputation 
loss or legal exposure due to missing their own forecasts.I 77 Em-
pirical literature studying the Chinese markets has found that 
174 See, e.g., Atiase et al., supra note 171, at 522 n.12; Grace Pownall, 
Charles Wasley & Gregory Waynrire, The Stock Price Effects of Alternative 
Types of Management Earnings Forecasts, 68 ACCT. REV. 896, 899 (1993); 
AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, § 301.08(a). 
Cf. Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management Through Real Activities 
Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 363 (2006) (stating that, unlike man· 
agement forecasts, analyst forecasts can continue beyond the year-end until 
shortly before the earnings announcement date, and that, during the year, man-
agement can form expectations of the analysts' final consensus forecast out-
standing prior to the management's earnings announcement). 
175 See, e.g., Atiase et al., supra note 171, at 522 n.12; Leonard Soffer, S. 
Ramu Thiagarajan & Beverly R. Walther, Earnings Preannouncement Strat-
egies, 5 REV. ACCT. STU. 5, 5 (2000). 
176 In 2013, the CSRC began to require IPO and listed issuers to disclose their 
government subsidy-related information in notes to annual financial state-
ments. See CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N, CSRC 2013-38: IPO AND LISTED ISSUER 
DISCLOSURE INTERPRETIVE GUIDE No. 2---GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY DISCLOSURE 
IN NOTES TO ANNuAL FiNANCIAL STATEMENTS (2013), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub 
/zjhpublic/g003062011201309/P020130927528247963554.doc [https://perma.cc 
/EH9K-UJGH]. 
m See Anne Beyer, Capital Markets Prices, Management Forecasts, and 
Earnings Management, 84 ACCT. REV. 1713, 1723--25 (2009); Ron Kasznik, On 
the Association Between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings Management, 37 J. 
ACCT. RES. 57, 61--62, 79--80 (1999). 
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government's strategic, selective subsidies to listed firms are 
"pervasive," with the government pursuing its socio-political 
agenda via the listed issuers, and issuers managing earnings using 
the government subsidies to meet regulatory requirements or mar-
ket expectations.178 Separate tabulations of government subsidies 
in both furecasted and reported earnings will ensure a comparable 
basis for measuring forecast errors, bringing greater transparency 
to issuer forecasting ability and enhancing fairness of the forecast 
accuracy-based public enforcement.t79 Furthermore, since oper-
ating income and non-core earnings are shown to have different 
implications for firm valuation, tao separate disclosure of the gov-
ernment subsidy component in earnings forecasts and earnings 
reports may help avoid any misleading inferences about firm value 
or its risk.tBt 
Third, with respect to discretionary or voluntary disclosure, 
literature has told "a compelling economic story''1B2 that, in the 
presence of firm proprietary costs or investor uncertainty about 
firm information, and consistent with efficient disclosure choices-
such as by comparing the information asymmetry component of 
the cost of capital with the disclosure-related proprietary costs-
firms will neither fully disclose nor totally withhold information 
about firm value, despite the fact that the market rationally 
178 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Martin Walker & Cheng Zeng, Do Chinese Gov-
ernment Subsidies Affect Firm Value?, 39 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y 149, 149-52 
(2014); Xingzhi Xiao & Yipan Wang, Subsidy for Innovation: Is It Solely Applied 
to Innovation?, 4 ECON. MGMT. 19, 25, 29 (2014); Qingquan Tang & Danglun Luo, 
Motives and Consequences of Government Subsidies to Chinese Listed Issuers: 
An Empirical Study, 6 FIN. RES. 149, 154 (2007). 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 107-11, 128; infra text ac-
companying notes 206-11; see also liANwEN CHEN, SECURITIES MARKETS AND 
ACCOUNTING REGULATION 228 (Beijing, China Fin. & Econ. Pub. House 2001) 
(suggesting that, in computing forecast errors for enforcement purposes, 
"recurring earnings" should be separated from "nonrecurring earnings" in 
order to have a consistent and comparable basis). 
180 Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth & Daniel Gao, The Information Content 
of Earnings Components: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market, 20 EUR. 
ACCT. REV. 669, 673 (2011). 
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(2) (2016); Guides for Disclosure of Projections 
of Future Economic Performance, supra note 26, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,248; see 
also supra note 177. 
182 See Verrecchia, supra note 3, at 160. 
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interprets the withheld information_183 Economic literature has 
also stated that it is inefficient for firms to precommit to a policy 
of full disclosure.184 The Chinese regulatory policy imposing ob-
ligations on voluntary disclosers to timely update their earnings 
projections and to follow up disclosing variances185 in effect pre-
sents firms with an inefficient "precommitment mechanism of 
full disclosure" akin to "getting on a treadmill that one cannot get 
off,"l86 which will discourage voluntary disclosure. To encourage 
voluntary projections, the voluntary regime should create an eco-
nomically efficient disclosure environment, allowing issuers to 
append a forewarning to a projection that the projection is not 
intended to be updated, to postpone updating with a timely cau-
tionary explanation, or to suspend an issued projection against 
any continued use_187 This could be accomplished via a current 
183 Id. at 141--47, §§ 3.5, 4.2 (expounding efficiency-based voluntary disclosure 
theory); Ronald Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, 23 J. AcCT. 
RES. 123, §§ 1, 3 (1985) (extending the Grossman-Milgrom unraveling idea in 
stating that investor uncertainty about management's information endowment 
induces partial disclosure); Robert Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 179, §§ 1, 5 (1983) (extending the Grossman-Milgrom unrav-
eling idea in stating that proprietary costs raise the equilibrium threshold level 
of disclosure and introduce noise to possible interpretations of withheld infor-
mation). For the original Grossman-Milgrom unraveling idea, see Sanford J. 
Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about 
Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 462--63, 465 (1981) (stating that ra-
tional expectations of the buyer propel full disclosure by the seller to maximize 
profit); Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems 
and Applications, 12 BELLJ. ECON. 380, § 5 (1981) (stating that, at a sequen-
tial equilibrium, the buyer's attitude is one of extreme skepticism and the 
salesman's best strategy is one offull disclosure). 
184 See Verrecchia, supra note 3, at 146-47, 155. 
185 See supra text accompanying notes 134-35, 145. The SEC adopts a 
similar policy on duty to update and variance disclosure. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.10(b)(3)(ii)--{iii) (2016); supra text accompanying notes 22--23. 
186 See Verrecchia, supra note 3; John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & 
Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 
40 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 3, § 6.2.1 (2005); see also Oesterle, supra note 29. 
187 See AI CPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION§§ 8.48--8.51 
(2013); see also Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) 
("[A] statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and conno-
tation upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, 
and there is a change, correction, more exactly, further disclosure, may be 
called for."). 
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report,188 based on the disclosure cost-benefit determination made 
by the issuer, and absent any manipulative intent on the part of 
the issuer to inflate or deflate its stock price.189 
B. Some Building Blocks for Ex Ante Regulation of 
Issuer Projections 
I. Issuer Safe Harbor Conditional on Audit Review 
The requirement of audit review of issuer earnings projections 
currently depends on three circumstances. Transaction-triggered 
issuer earnings projections, such as those made in connection with 
188 In 1975, the SEC proposed the integration of issuers' voluntary public 
projections into the disclosure system of the federal securities laws, including 
a requirement to file a Form 8-K when the issuer ''has reason to believe that 
its public projections no longer have a reasonable basis or has determined to 
cease disclosing or revising projections." See Future Economic Performance 
Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,317. In 1976, the SEC withdrew 
its proposal, "[d]ue to the important legal, disclosure policy and technical is-
sues raised by the commentators." &e False or Misleading Statements in the 
Solicitation of Proxies; Projections, Securities Act Release No. 5699, Exchange 
Act Release No. 12,371, 41 Fed. Reg. 19,932, 19,932 (May 14, 1976). The volun-
tary projection policy adopted by the SEC since 1978 does not require a Form 
8-K filing for updating or discontinuing projections. See Guides for Disclosure 
of Projections of Future Economic Performance, supra note 26, 43 Fed. Reg. 
at 53,247; 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3) (2016); cf Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities Act Release No. 8400, 
Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,604 (2004); Current 
Report (Form 8-K: Item 4.02) (OMB Exp. Mar. 31, 2018). 
189 See, e.g., Stephen Baginski, John Hassell & Michael Kimbrough, Why 
Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 5 (2004) 
(stating that demand for forward-looking information may vary across firms and 
through time while costs of disclosure remain potentially high, and that man-
agers are likely to disclose only when the benefits of meeting the demand ex-
ceed the costs of supplying the disclosure); D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce & Shankar 
Venkataraman, Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework, 
22 ACCT. HORIZONS 315, 324 (2008) (citing studies documenting that man-
agers' forecasting behaviors can be influenced by their own self-interest, such 
as different managerial incentives in connection with equity-based compensa-
tion, around equity offerings, during stock option award periods, or when engag-
ing in insider trading). The issuer's "disclosure cost-benefit'' determination and 
absence of "manipulative intent'' standard proposed by this Article stands in 
contrast to the SEC's "reasonable basis'' standard, for updating, discontinuing, 
and resuming voluntary projections. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii)-{iv) (2016); 
see supra text accompanying notes 23, 31-32. 
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a public offering or a related party SAR transaction, are required 
to be attested by a qualified accounting firm regardless of whether 
such projections are mandatory or voluntary.190 Listed issuers' vol-
untary earnings projections with a full-year projection horizon are 
also required to be attested by a qualified accounting firm. 191 
Benchmark Issuers' mandatory earnings forecasts made in con-
nection with their periodic and current reporting are not subject 
to any audit review at all_192 
To encourage issuer voluntary forecast disclosure,193 and for 
the market to benefit from informational intermediaries' moni-
toring role over issuer forecasting process, 194 this Article recom-
mends a safe harbor for issuer projections conditioned on an 
advance audit review of the projections. Such an audit review 
could be performed by a qualified public accounting firm 195 or by 
190 See supra Parts LA-LB. 
191 See supra Part I. C. 
192 Id. 
193 See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities 
Act Release No. 5362, Exchange Act Release No. 9984, 38 Fed. Reg. 7220, 7221 
(Mar. 19, 1973) ("[O]ne of the primary deterrents to a rational and open disclo-
sure system for projections is the fear of liability for inaccurate projections."); 
Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K Nelson, The Impact of Securities 
Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High 
Technology Firms, 39 J. AcCT. REs. 297, 305, 323 (2001) (sampling firms in high 
technology industries in the two years immediately surrounding the 1995 
enactment of the PSLRA and finding increased levels of voluntary earnings 
forecasts in response to the PSLRA, and finding neither improvement nor 
deterioration in forecast quality following the PSLRA enactment); see also 
supra Table 5. 
194 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687-89 (1984) (commenting 
on the role of accountants as informational intermediaries); George Blazenko 
& William Scott, A Model of Standard Setting in Auditing, 3 CONTEMP. AcCT. 
RES. 68, 69 (1986) (commenting on auditing as a monitoring device); AlCPA, 
FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, § 301.29-30 (describing 
the attestation process as involving the following: evaluating the preparation 
of the prospective financial statements, the support underlying their assump-
tions, and their presentation; and, on the basis of such examination, render-
ing an opinion on whether the prospective financial statements are presented 
in conformity with AlCPA Guide Prospective Financial Information and 
whether the assumptions provide a reasonable basis for management's fore-
cast or for management's projection given the hypothetical assumptions). 
196 For a registered public accounting firm in China to engage in "securities 
and futures-related business," it must be jointly qualified by and subject to the 
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the issuer's board of directors' audit committee_196 An ex ante audit 
review of the support for management's material assumptions, 
coupled with an ex ante management disclosure of probability 
distributions or other probabilistic statements relating to its pro-
jections, is superior to management's ex ante disclosure of mate-
rial assumptions and its ex post analysis of historical variances 
as are currently required_l97 The ex ante assumption disclosure 
may harm the firm's competitive interests, while the ex post vari-
ance analysis may be of limited utility to users of projections in a 
significantly changing business environment. taB A foundation for 
joint supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the CSRC. "Securities and 
futures-related business" is defined to mean auditing, verification, examination, 
and attestation engagements (e.g., auditing of financial statements and attes-
tation of earnings projections) performed for "securities and futures firms." 
"Securities and futures firms" refer to issuers, securities trading, clearing, and 
settlement intermediaries, stock and futures exchanges, investment funds, and 
investment management companies. &e Ministry of Finance & China Sec. Reg. 
Comm'n, MOF 2012-2: Notice Concerning Securities and Futures-Related 
Business Qualification of Public Accounting Firms, arts. 1, 6-7 (20 12) (West-
law China JJlt (Westlaw China)). As of December 31, 2013, there were forty 
such qualified firms. See MINISTRY OF FINANCE & CHINA SEC. REG. COMM'N, 
MOF-CSRC 2014-13: LIST OF SECURITIES-QUALIFIED PuBLIC ACCOUNTING 
FIRMS (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic/G00306213/201 
403/W020 140310620717659195.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9WW -Z382]. 
196 &e, e.g., Bruce J. McConomy, Bias and Accuracy of Management Earnings 
Forecasts: An Evaluation of the Impact of Auditing, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 
167, 189--90 (1998) (documenting that, in the Canadian market, auditing of 
management forecasts reduced forecasting bias but not forecast errors); Irene 
Karamanou & Nikos V afeas, The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit 
Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 43 
J. ACCT. RES. 453, 481 (2005) (finding that, in the U.S. market, effective board 
audit committees were related to greater forecast accuracy in both good news 
and bad news samples); see also HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE 
DISCWSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PuRPoSE 281-82 (1979) (emphwrizing 
the importance of independent judgmental opinions on soft information, and 
recommending that the accounting profession act as ombudsman in the public 
interest and participate in attestation functions on disclosures that are judg-
mental and nonobjective). 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 61, 127, 135. The SEC adopts a sim-
ilar policy favoring ex ante assumption disclosure and ex post variance disclo-
sure. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(i)-(ii) (2016); supra note 26. 
198 For literature supporting this view, see, for example, AICPA, GUIDE 
FOR A REVIEW OF A FINANCIAL FORECAST 4 7-48 (2nd ed. 1982) (encouraging 
forecast preparers to develop ranges, probabilistic statements, or estimates of 
2016] CHINESE ISSUER EARNINGS FORECASTS 509 
the safe harbor thus is for the Chinese issuers and the accounting 
profession to develop adequate standards and presentation guide-
lines for the preparation and attestation of issuer projections.199 
2. Open and Transparent Legal Framework a Necessary 
Complement to Safe Harbor 
A "Fidelity-based capital markets legal and regulatory system" 
was espoused by the State Council in 2004.200 In 2006, the CSRC 
adopted a confidential "Program of Action for Fidelity Building 
in Securities and Futures Markets"; in 2008, the CSRC launched 
a confidential "Central Fidelity File System for Securities and 
Futures Markets." Both actions by the CSRC were designed to 
record legal, regulatory, and administrative violations by capital 
error to supplement the determination of the single most probable forecasted 
financial result); John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Management Fore-
casts, 14 J. CORP. L. 547, § VILA (1989) (recommending management disclo-
sure of probability distributions associated with forecasts); Verrecchia, supra 
note 183, at 181-82, 191 (1983) (positing that proprietary cost of disclosure may 
arise from both favorable and unfavorable information, particularly for firms 
in highly competitive industries); AlCPA, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE 
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ch. 7 (1973) (stating that changes in tech-
nology, industry conditions, businesses, and management may make the future 
significantly different from the past and that detailed presentation of assump-
tions supporting forecasts may adversely affect the firm's competitive position). 
199 The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) issued 
two pronouncements in 1996 and 2006 governing attestation of "earnings pro-
jections'' and "prospective financial information" respectively. See CICPA, 
1996-456 BULLETIN NO. 4: ATTESTATION OF EARNINGS PROJECTIONS (1997) 
(Westlaw China JJj$ (Westlaw China)); CICPA, 2006-X Standard No. 3111: 
Attestation of Prospective Financial Information (2007) (Westlaw China JJj$ 
(Westlaw China)). Both pieces have been criticized by accounting academics 
for being "so incomplete and inadequate as to greatly increase audit risks." 
See, e.g., Yaoming Jiang, Prospective Financial Information Disclosure and 
Regulation: Drawing on the U.S. Experience, 12 CONTEMP. FIN. & ECON. 101, 
103 (2007); cf AlCPA, FINANCIAL FORECASTS AND PROJECTIONS, supra note 4, 
§ 301; AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION (2013). 
200 See State Council, SC 2004-3: Opinion on Further Development and 
Reform of Capital Markets § 7 (2004) (Westlaw China JJj$ (Westlaw China)). 
The State Council "is the executive organ of the highest national authority, and 
is the highest national administrator." NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., CONSTITUTION 
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA § 3.3 (2004) (Westlaw China JJj$ 
(Westlaw China)); cf U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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markets participants, and to provide for the use of such data by 
the CSRC in its future administrative, regulatory, and enforce-
ment actions relating to such parties.201 In 2012, the CSRC pub-
lished the Securities and Futures Markets Fidelity Regulation 
(Provisional),202 which, as amended in 2014, specifies eight cate-
gories of persons whose Fidelity files are collected in the Central 
Fidelity File System.203 In 2014, the Central Fidelity File System 
was expanded to become an inter-governmental information 
sharing platform, so that "any capital markets Fidelity violator 
will be punished and dealt with not only by the CSRC but also 
similarly by other governmental agencies."204 
201 &e, e.g., Instilling a Fidelity Culture in the Securities Industry, CIDNA SEC. 
REG. COMM'N JJANGXI PROVINCE BRANCH (Mar. 11, 2014), http://sdqyxc.dzwww 
.com/dybg/201403/t20140311_9445940.htm; CmNA SEC. REG. COMM'N, TwENTY 
YEARS OF CIDNA'S CAPITAL MARKETS ch. 25 (2010) (BEIJING: ClllNA CITIC PRESS 
2010); CIDNA SEC. REG. COMM'N, CSRC BULLETIN 2008-11: CENTRAL FIDELITY 
FILE SYSTEM FOR SECURITIES AND FuTURES MARKETS LAUNCHED (Nov. 24, 2008), 
http:/lwww.csrc.gov.cn/publnewsite/zjhxwfblxwddl200812ft20081226_68639.html 
[https://perma.cc1QJ69-6DZK]. 
202 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2012-80: Securities and Futures Markets 
Fidelity Regulation (Provisional) (2012) (Westlaw China JJ~ (Westlaw China)). 
203 China Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2014-106: Securities and Futures 
Markets Fidelity Regulation (Provisional) (2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub 
/zjhpublic/G0030620 1120 1409/P020 140919480923759622. pdf [https://perma.cc 
IXC66-PLJ4] [hereinafter Fidelity Regulation]. Persons covered by the Central 
Fidelity File System include: 
issuers and their officers, directors, major stockholders, and 
controlling persons; securities and futures firms and their asso-
ciated persons; investment management firms and their associ-
ated persons; investment research firms and their associated 
persons; professional services organizations serving the secu-
rities and futures industries, such as accounting firms, asset 
appraisal firms, credit rating agencies, law firms, public rela-
tions firms, investor relations firms, and computer software and 
hardware providers, and employees of such professional ser-
vices organizations; domestic and foreign institutional inves-
tors and their fund managers; representative offices of foreign 
securities-type firms in China; and any person with securities 
and futures markets-related Fidelity regulation violations. 
Id. art. 7. 
204 See Capital Markets Fidelity File System Launched, CHINA SEC. REG. 
COMM'N (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.csrc.gov.cn/publnewsite/zjhxwfblxwdd/2014 
08/t20140808_258971.html [https://perma.cci5N54-K7WG]. 
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Among others, 205 the following earnings disclosure-related 
events are recorded in the Central Fidelity File System: 
(1) An issuer fails to disclose a mandatory earnings 
forecast, or fails to timely disclose a material up-
date to its previous earnings disclosure whether 
mandatory or voluntary, or a material disparity ex-
ists between the issuer's forecasted or prean-
nounced earnings and actual reported earnings.2oa 
(2) Under a stock exchange's disclosure rating scale 
declining from A to D, an issuer is given a Disclo-
sure Rating D due to the sign error of its annual 
earnings projection or preannouncement, such as a 
projected or preannounced profit versus an actual 
loss, or vice versa; is given a Disclosure Rating C 
due to its over-projection or over-preannouncement 
of annual earnings by a threshold 50 percent; or is 
denied a Disclosure Rating A (regardless of its other 
disclosure performance) due to its over-projection or 
over-preannouncement of annual earnings by a 
threshold 20 percent.207 
(3) An SAR counterpart did not live up to its undertak-
ings made in connection with an SAR transaction. 20s 
206 The Fidelity Regulation lists twelve categories of Fidelity Information. 
See CSRC 2014-106, supra note 203, art. 8. 
206 SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2013-4: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE 
RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINARY AND REGULATORY ACTIONS, art. 19(5) (2013), 
http://www.sse.eom.cn/lawandrules/sserules/organization/clc_20130620_3722134 
.shtml [https://perma.cc/8E44-US4R]; SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2013-14: 
PuBLIC CENSURE CRITERIAAPPLICARLE TO SME ISSUERS, art. 5 (2013) http://www 
.szse.cn/main/files/20 13/01/16/981797909583.pdf [https://perms.cc/UM5X-HCGG]; 
SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2011-103: PuBLIC CENSURE CRITERIA APPLICA-
BLE TO CHINEXT ISSUERS, art. 5 (2011), http://www.szse.cn/main/rule/bsywgz 
/397 45335.shtml [https://perma.cc/QQ3U -663Z]. 
207 See, e.g., SHENZHEN STOCK EXCH., SZSE 2013-112: LiSTED ISSUER DISCLO-
SUREPERFORMANCERATINGGUIDE, arts. 17(4), 17(16), 18(4), 18(16), 19(5) (2013), 
http://www.szse.cn/mainlimages/2013/04/08/20130408172252427.pdf [https:/1 
perma.cc/3EYH-XKL4]; SHANGHAI STOCK EXCH., SHSE 2015-X: LiSTED ISSUER 
DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE RATING GUIDE, arts. 24(5), 25(2) (2015), http:// 
www.sse.eom.cn/aboutuslhotandd/ssenews/clc_20150427_3915726.shtml [https:/1 
perma.cc/D2EL-ACFE]. 
208 CSRC 2014-106, supra note 203, art. 8(4). 
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(4) An underwriter sponsored the offering of an issuer 
who over-projected earnings by a threshold 20 per-
cent during the underwriter's post-offering continu-
ing sponsorship period (which lasts between two to 
four years depending on the listing board of the is-
suer and IPO or follow-on offering).209 An accountant 
signed the attestation report on an issuer's earnings 
projections made in connection with a public offering, 
where the issuer over-projected earnings by a thresh-
old 20 percent.2to A financial advisor advised the is-
suer with respect to an SAR transaction, an assets 
appraiser signed the SAR assets appraisal report, 
and an accountant signed the SAR earnings projec-
tion attestation report, where earnings attributable 
to the issuer or the purchased assets were over-
projected by a threshold 20 percent.211 
In stark contrast to the confidential public enforcement, the 
Chinese Securities Law has never expressly authorized any pri-
vate rights of action for materially false or misleading statements, 
whether in forward-looking disclosure or otherwise.212 To fill the 
legislative void,213 the Adjudication Committee of the Chinese 
209 CSRC 2009-63, supra note 43, arts. 11, 36, 72(6). 
210 CSRC 2015-122, supra note 45, arts. 55-56; CSRC 2006-30, supra note 66, 
art. 67. 
211 Chlna Sec. Reg. Comm'n, CSRC 2008-54: Regulation of Listed Issuer M&A 
Financial Advisors, arts. 38, 40 (2008), http://www.csrc.gov.cnlpub/zjhpublic 
/G00306207/200807/t20080708_25655.htm [https://perma.cc/985A-RQSU]; 
CSRC 2014-109, supra note 82, art. 59. 
212 See SECURlTIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, art. 207; SECURITIES LAW 2004, 
supra note 52, art. 207; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2005-43: SECURITIES LAW 
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 232 (2006) (Westlaw Chlna /J1f 
(Westlaw China)); NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2013-5: SECURlTIES LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 232 (2013) (Westlaw Chlna 7J1f (Westlaw 
Chlna)); SECURlTIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, art. 232. 
213 Under the Chinese Law of Legislation in effect as of 2000, national 
legislative power resided exclusively in the National People's Congress (NPC) 
and the Standing Committee of the NPC: the NPC was to legislate in the areas 
of "fundamental laws" and the Standing Committee in other areas as well as 
when the NPC was in recess. The power to interpret law resided exclusively in 
the Standing Committee, and its legal interpretations had the same force and 
effect as law. See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2000-31: LAW OF LEGISLATION OF 
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Supreme People's Court (SPC), the highest court in China,2I4 
has released four judicial interpretations since 2001 addressing 
securities-related private causes of action: 
(1) Notice of Non-Acceptance of Securities-Related Pri-
vate Damage Actions ('SPC 2001"), citing ''legislative 
and judicial constraints";2I5 
(2) Notice of Acceptance of Private Tort Actions on Ac-
count of Securities-Related False Statement ("SPC 
2002"), acknowledging China's WTO member obli-
gation to provide judicial relief;2I6 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 7, 42, 47 (2000) (Westlaw China JJ:fllt 
(Westlaw China)). 
In a puzzling twist, the Organizational Law of the People's Courts, which took 
effect in 2007, grants the Chinese Supreme People's Court the "power to inter-
pret laws" without any case or controversy before it. See STAND. COMM. OF THE 
NPC, PRC 2006-59: ORGANIZATIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 32 (2007) (Westlaw China JJ:fllt (Westlaw 
China)); cf U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
Perhaps aware of the inconsistency between the Law of Legislation and the 
Organizational Law of the People's Courts, in August of 2014, the Legislative 
Sub-Committee of the NPC Standing Committee proposed amending the Law 
of Legislation to, inter alia, add an article to recognize the Supreme People's 
Court's power to interpret law without any case adjudication-a power to be 
shared with the NPC Standing Committee-provided that any such judicial 
interpretation by the Supreme People's Court be filed with the NPC Standing 
Committee within 30 days of its pronouncement. See LEGISLATIVE SUB-COMM. 
OF NPC STANDING COMM., NPC 2014-00: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE LAW 
OF LEGISLATION , 28 (2014) (Westlaw China ::ff:fllt (Westlaw China)). The 
amendment was enacted on March 15, 2015. See NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 
2015-20: LAW OF LEGISLATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF C!llNA, art. 104 
(2015) (Westlaw China ::ff:fllt (Westlaw China)). 
214 See PRC 2006-59, supra note 213, art. 29. The "Adjudication Committee" 
is the management body of the Supreme People's Court, whose meetings may 
be attended by the prosecutorial branch of the government. Id. art. 10; cf U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. 
215 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2001-406: Notice of Non-Acceptance of 
Securities-Related Private Damage Actions (2001) (Westlaw China JJ :flit 
(Westlaw China)). 
216 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2002-X: Notice of Acceptance of Private Tort 
Actions on Account of Securities-Related False Statement (2002) (Westlaw 
China JJ:fllt (Westlaw China)). See also GUOGUANG LI & WEI JIA, PRIVATE 
DAMAGES FOR SECURITIES-RELATED FALSE STATEMENTS 262 (BEIJING: LAW 
PRESS 2003). 
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(3) Certain Substantive and Procedural Requirements 
Governing Adjudication of Private Damage Actions 
on Account of Securities-Related False Statement 
(''SPC 2003"), hailed by its drafter as "the first 
comprehensive judicial interpretation of law govern-
ing securities-related private action adjudication," 
"supplementing criminal and administrative enforce-
ment with an indispensable private enforcement con-
ditional on the former'';217 and 
(4) Pronouncement Concerning Adjudication of Private 
Tort and Damage Actions on Account of Untrue Audit 
Report (''SPC 2007").218 
In essence,219 under SPC 2003, if an administrative penalty by 
the CSRC or another governmental agency or a criminal sanction 
by a court has been imposed on a defendant for a securities-related 
false statement, a private party220 may bring a civil damage ac-
tion against the defendant for that false statement.221 Potential 
defendants under the SPC 2003 are the following: (1) the issuer, its 
controlling shareholder and de facto controlling person, members 
of the board of directors, board of supervision, and management; 
217 Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2003-2: Certain Substantive and Procedural 
Requirements Governing Adjudication of Private Damage Actions on Account 
of Securities-Related False Statement (2003) (Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw 
China)). See also LI & JIA, supra note 216, at 281, 284. 
21
• Sup. People's Ct., SPC 2007-12: Pronouncement Concerning Adjudication 
of Private Tort and Damage Actions on Account of Untrue Audit Report (2007) 
(Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw China)). 
21
" For a detailed analysis of the SPC Judicial Interpretation 2003-2 by its 
drafter, see LI & JIA, supra note 216. 
220 The suit must be brought as an "individual action" or a "joint action" 
where there are multiple plaiotiffs. In a joint action, the plaintiffs shall elect 
(or the court shall appoint where the plaintiffs fail to so elect) two to five plain-
tiff representatives. The court will publish a notice of action and all putative 
plaintiffs must register with the court in time to be eligible to join the joint ac-
tion and to elect or be elected as plaiotiff representatives. Parties who did not 
register with the court but subsequently brought a separate action within the 
statute of limitations will be bound by the judicial decision rendered in the joint 
action. See SPC 2003-2, supra note 217, § 3; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 2012-59: 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 52--54 
(2013) (Westlaw China 7Jjl!!: (Westlaw China)). 
221 See SPC 2003-2, supra note 217, art. 5. 
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(2) intermediaries such as underwriters, offering and listing spon-
soring firms, accounting firms, law firms, assets appraisal firms, 
and their employees with direct responsibility for the false state-
ment; and (3) any other person who made the false statement.222 
"Securities-related false statement" is defined to mean "an un-
true statement contrary to facts, a misleading statement, a ma-
terial omission, or a disclosure improper as to timing or method, 
with respect to any 'material events' set forth in the Securities 
Law."223 In addition,224 under the SPC 2007, a private party who 
reasonably relied upon or otherwise used an untrue audit report 
in its transactions with the audited firm,225 or in trading the 
audited firm's securities, may sue the auditor for damages caused 
thereby without government action, prerequisite but conditional 
on the audited firm and its fraudulent stockholders being co-
defendants.226 "Untrue audit report" is defined to mean "an audit 
report containing any untrue statement, misleading statement, 
or material omission."227 
This Article contends that neither Fidelity regulation nor the 
Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretations (SPC 2003 and 
SPC 2007) obviate the need for a private right of action for 
222 I d. art. 7. 
223 Id. art. 17. See also SECURITIES LAW 1999, supra note 42, arts. 59--62, 
72; SECURITIES LAw 2014, supra note 45, arts. 63, 65--67, 78. 
224 For a detailed analysis of the SPC Judicial Interpretation 2007-12 by 
its drafter, see Crv. Drv. No. 2 OF SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. (Xiaoming Xi ed.); TORT 
AND DAMAGE LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS FOR AUDITS: AN ANALYSIS OF Su-
PREME PEoPLE'S COURT'S JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (Beijing: The People's Court 
Press 2007). 
225 SPC 2007-12, supra note 218, art. 2. According to its drafter, SPC 2007-12 
contemplates as plaintiffs both investors trading the audit client firm's secu-
rities and persons who have transactional or contractual relationships with the 
audit client firm (such as lenders and suppliers of the firm). See XI, supra 
note 224, at 71; cf. "In connection with" concept under U.S. securities law. See, 
e.g., Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1069 (2014) (citing SEC 
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)) ("warning against 'construing' the 
phrase 'in connection with' 'so broadly as to convert any common-law fraud 
that happens to involve securities into a § 10(b) violation"'). 
226 SPC 2007-12, supra note 218, arts. 1-3. Any damages shall be paid first 
by the audited firm and its fraudulent stockholders, and then by the auditor 
to the extent of any unpaid damage and in proportion to the auditor's fault. 
Id. art. 10. 
227 Id. art. 2. 
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fraudulent forward-looking information. First, regulation by Fi-
delity File per se does not bring injured investors any economic 
relief although it may result in government allocation of resources. 
This is achieved by the government denying an inaccurate fore-
casting issuer and rewarding an accurate forecaster with access 
to the capital markets, and imposing on the former other immedi-
ate and real-not merely future and reputational-penalties.22s 
Second, "securities-related false statement" is defined by the 
SPC 2003 by reference to the Securities Law's listing of "material 
events," which in turn are defined as the occurrences of the spec-
ified events.229 "Untrue audit report" is defined by the SPC 2007 
22s See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 107-11, 128, 204. It is a 
questionable conclusion that "public criticisms have significant effects on 
[Chinese]listed companies and their executives." See Benjamin L. Liebman & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China's Securities Market, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929--30, Part III (2008). Rather, it is the real benefits the 
CSRC denies to, or the real costs the CSRC imposes on, an issuer and other 
related market participants in conjunction with a public criticism that produce 
the stock price effect or otherwise adversely affect the parties involved. See, 
e.g., Yunling Song & Xinwei Ji, Enforcement Actions and Their Effectiveness in 
Securities Regulation: Empirical Evidence from Management Earnings Fore-
casts, 5 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 59, 61-62 n.2 (2012) (stating that market reac-
tion in an event study reflects the informational content of the issuer's fraud 
and not of the regulator's effectiveness); Donghua Chen, Yuyan Guan, Gang 
Zhao & Feifei Wu, Securities Regulation and Implicit Penalties, 4 CHINAJ. AcCT. 
REs. 47, 48 (2011) (stating that a reduction in the market share of the underwrit-
ing business suffered by the underwriters associated with their IPO client issu-
ers' violations was not due to any reputational effect but was due to the CSRC's 
real penalties imposed on the underwriters for their clients' violations); see 
also Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, Causes and Con-
sequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforce-
ment Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 3, 7 (1996). 
229 The Securities Law specifies twelve "material events": 
For the purposes of current reporting, occurrence of any of the 
following shall constitute a "material event": (1) any material 
change to the business policy and business scope of the company; 
(2) company decision concerning material investment or ma-
terial assets acquisition; (3) company entering into a significant 
contract potentially having significant impact on its assets, lia-
bility, equity, and results of operations; (4) company incurring 
or default on a material debt; (5) company suffering material 
operating or other losses; (6) material changes to the conditions 
external to the company business operations; (7) changes to any 
director of board, one third of board of supervision, or any senior 
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with respect to "auditing activities prescribed in the Law of the 
People's Republic of China Governing Certified Public Accoun-
tants," which do not include attestation of prospective financial 
information.230 Thus, private causes of action under the SPC 2003 
or the SPC 2007 are based on information of current and historical 
facts only, to the exclusion of forward-looking information. 231 
Lastly, while conditioning private actions on successful govern-
ment action may prevent "frivolous litigation'' and "entrepreneur-
ial lawyer" abuses, 232 unchecked agency discretion may leave 
management of the company; (8) sizable change in ownership 
or control of any 5 percent shareholders or de facto controlling 
person(s) of the company; (9) company decision to reduce its 
share capital, merge, divest, dissolve, or apply for bankruptcy; 
(10) any major litigation involving the company; a resolution 
of the shareholder meeting or of the board of directors being 
nullified or declared invalid by law; (11) company or any mem· 
hers of its board of directors, board of supervision, or manage· 
ment being subject to criminal investigation; and (12) such other 
events as may be specified by the State Council securities 
regulatory agency. 
See SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 67. The CSRC'slist oftwenty·one 
material events is generally similar to the Securities Law's list of twelve ma· 
terial events, although it contains greater detail. See CSRC 2007 ·40, supra 
note 76, art. 30; see also supra text accompanying note 223. 
230 See SPC 2007·12, supra note 218, art. 1; NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., PRC 
2014·14: LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBIJC OF CHINA GOVERNING CERTIFIED 
PUBIJC ACCOUNTANTS, art. 14 (2014) (Westlaw China ]Jj$ (Westlaw China)); 
see also supra text accompanying note 227. 
231 Not surprisingly, neither the ten·year (2002--2011) review of private 
securities litigation in China nor the five·year (2007-2011) assessment of the 
CSRC's sanctions against listed issuers documented any single case based on 
an issuer's fraudulent forward· looking statement. See Robin Hui Huang, Pri· 
vate Enforcement of Securities Law in China: A Ten· Year Retrospective and 
Empirical Assessment, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 757, 763-64 (2013); Weixia Gu, Secu· 
rities Arbitration in China: A Better Alternative to Retail Shareholder Protec· 
tion, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 283, 290--91 n.29 (2013); see also XINMIN LIU, 
THE ESSENTIALS OF THE CHINESE SECURITIES LAWS 275 n.2 (Beijing, Peking 
Univ. Press 2013) (stating that the "securities·related false statement" within 
the meaning of SPC 2003 refers to historical information, and thus does not 
reach forward·looking statements); BING PENG, CHINESE SECURITIES REGULA· 
TION 343 (Beijing, Higher Edu. Press 2007) ("As of current time, there has never 
been a single case of civil damage action based on material disparity between 
projected earnings and realized earnings."). 
232 Securities Litigation Reform Proposals S.240, S.667, and H.R.1058: Hear· 
ings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and 
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investors at the mercy of "regulatory capture."233 More specifically 
under China's institutional setting, the government is the control-
ling shareholder of most large issuers in most industry sectors. 234 
Both the securities regulators and the judiciary are part of the 
centralized government system.235 The confidential Central Fidel-
ity File System creates an informational asymmetry between the 
regulated firms and the public investors,236 which, worsened by 
an undefined "force majeure" exoneration power wielded by the 
regulators,237 makes discretionary public enforcement real. 
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 104-157, 4 (1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher 
J. Dodd); see also Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities 
Act Release No. 7101, Exchange Act Release No. 34,831, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723, 
52,732 (1994) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Concept Release] (soliciting comments 
on conditioning private antifraud actions on successful Commission fraud ac-
tion); Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litiga-
tion: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1055, 1107, 1110 (1999) (proposing an SEC-supervised mandatory arbi-
tration program for private securities claims against public companies as the 
best means to eliminate frivolous suits, citing the SEC's reputation as a tough, 
fair, and pro-investor regulator). 
233 See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforce-
ment: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 §liLA 
(2002). For a discussion of the main theoretical and empirical literatures on 
regulatory capture, see Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 203 (2006). 
234 See supra Tables 1-2. 
235 See supra text accompanying notes 213-14; see also Walter Hutchens, 
Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China's Legal 
System?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 599 §§ 3.3, 3.5 (2003); Donghua Chen, 
Dequan Jiang, Shangkun Liang & Fangping Wang, Selective Enforcement of 
Regulation, 4 CHINAJ. AcCT. REs. 9 (2011) (examining the CSRC enforcement 
data for the period 1994-2008 and finding that SOEs received less severe 
punishments than privately controlled issuers, and that central SOEs received 
lighter punishments than local SOEs); Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, & 
Wenfeng Wu, The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on 
Corporate Litigation in China, 54 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2011) (examining liti-
gation data for the period from 1999--2005 and finding evidence of court bias 
in favor of state-controlled issuers). 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 204-18; see also B6, supra note 233, 
at 210 (expounding a three-tier hierarchical agency model comprising three 
parties: a political principal (the government), its delegate (the regulator), and 
an agent (the regulated firm); and stating that asymmetric information between 
the principal and the agent is the source of regulatory discretion, making reg-
ulatory capture, or regulator-firm collusion, possible). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 109, 128. 
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This Article therefore recommends a model of private action 
for materially false or misleading historical and forward-looking 
information, conditioned on either the government's pre-action or 
a showing by the private party of regulatory capture. Such an al-
ternative avenue for private action should be designed both to 
compensate for any existing regulatory failure and to deter future 
captive relations between regulators and those they regulate.238 
Such a private action without the government action precondi-
tion could additionally be subject to a net social positive exter-
nality analysis. 239 
3. Ex Ante Perspective of "Fact" and "Materiality" of 
Projections Under Safe Harbor 
Antifraud provisions in U.S. securities law proscribes any "un-
true statement of a material fact,"240 not "untrue statements."241 
A statement of "fact" and a statement of "opinion" differ most 
importantly in the degrees of certainty and definiteness, and can 
be mutually embedded242: an apparent "opinion" may have "fact" 
cores, and vice versa.243 In 1994, the SEC noted an "implied factual 
238 See Zinn, supra note 233, § IV .A; see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.ECON. &MGMT. SCI. 3, 17-18 (1971); Renee M. 
Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforce-
ment, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 122--23 (2005). 
239 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private 
and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STuDIES 575 (1997) 
(stating that a privately determined level of litigation can be socially excessive 
or inadequate, and that corrective social policies may be needed to achieve a 
socially optimal level of litigation). 
240 See, e.g., 15 U.S. C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2), 77q(a)(2), 78n(e) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5(b) (2016). The antifraud provisions also prohibit any omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made not mis-
leading. Id. Despite different elements and scopes of claims under the various 
antifraud provisions, the fundamental concepts of "fact" and "materiality" are 
common to all. See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 
n.10, 372 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993). 
241 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1325-26 (2015). 
242 See id. at 1325, 1327. 
243 See Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 
121 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 256--57 (1973); see also Va. Bankshares v. Sandburg, 
501 U.S. 1083, 1092, 1095--96 (1991) (stating that, in the proxy solicitation 
520 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
assertions" doctrine to determine "an untrue statement of fact" in 
predictions and statements of opinion fur purposes of fraud liability: 
A projection or statement of belief contains at least three im-
plicit factual assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely 
believed, (2) that there is a reasonable basis for that beliet; and 
(3) that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts tending 
to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. 
If a prediction was not believed when made or did not have a 
valid basis, it would constitute an untrue statement of fact .... 244 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Omnicare, Inc. v. 
Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund,245 
every statement of opinion "explicitly" affirms one fact: that the 
speaker actually holds the stated belief. Thus, a false description 
of one's own state of mind constitutes an untrue statement of fact; 
context, directors' statements of reasons or belief "are factual in two senses: 
as statements that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief 
stated and as statements about the subject matter of the reason or belief 
expressed." Equivalently, the statements of reasons do not misstate the 
directors' reasons and do not mislead about the stated subject matter of the 
reason); AlCPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION § 1.03 (2013) 
("Prospective financial statements are based on assumptions regarding future 
events. The assumptions are in turn based on a combination of available 
information and judgment, in which both history and plans play a part."). 
244 Safe Harbor Concept Release, supra note 232, 59 Fed. Reg. at 52,727 
(citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
See also Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 11-13 (No. 08-5442-cv) (Jan. 21, 2010), 
Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that for pur-
poses of the statutory safe harbor, a forward-looking statement contains at 
least three implicit factual assertions, citing In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 
886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)); Kripke, supra note 5, at 1198-99 ("[T]he 
sole factual elements of a projection should be that it represents management's 
view, that it was reached in a rational fashion and that it is a sincere view. Only 
these elements can be subject to a statutory liability, not the eventuation of 
the prophecy."). 
245 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). While Omnicare addresses private claims under 
Section 11(a) of the Securities Act, it may also affect both private and govern-
ment actions under other "material misstatements and omissions" provisions 
of the federal securities laws. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Vacatur and Remand 1-2 (No. 13-435) (June 2014), Omnicare, 
Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 
(2015) [hereinafter United States, Omnicare Amicus Brief]. 
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conversely, an opinion actually held when made remains true even 
if later proved to be erroneous.246 A reasonable investor may make 
inferences about the issuer's basis for its opinion; thus, if mate-
rial facts conflict with a reasonable investor's expectations about 
the basis, but are undisclosed, the opinion is misleading.247 How-
ever, a reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known 
to an issuer supports its opinion. Whether an opinion is mislead-
ing when the issuer knows, but fails to disclose, facts undermin-
ing its opinion depends on a fair reading of the opinion in its 
full context. 248 
Thus, the "untrue statement of fact" in an earnings projection 
is not automatically the ex post discrepancy249 between projected 
and realized earnings: that provision is not "an invitation to 
Monday morning quarterback an issuer's opinions."250 Similarly, 
an objectively based251 projection may nevertheless turn out to be 
"objectively false" or ex post inaccurate. 252 But the U.S. securities 
246 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326-27. 
247 See id. at 1328--29. 
248 See id. at 1329--30; cf. supra text accompanying note 244. Under the 
SEC's third "implied factual assertion," the SEC would automatically treat a 
non-disclosure of certain fact "cutting the other way," or, disconfirming an opin-
ion, as misleading. In contrast, the Omnicare Court takes a holistic "fair 
reading" of an opinion "in its full context" approach to determine whether such 
non-disclosure would cause the opinion to be misleading. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1329--30. 
248 See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514, 518 (7th 
Cir. 1989) ("If all estimates are made carefully and honestly, half will turn 
out too favorable to the firm and the other half too pessimistic. In either case 
the difference may disappoint investors, who can say later that they bought 
for too much (if the projection was too optimistic) or sold for too little (if the 
projection turns out to be too pessimistic) .... The securities acts do not have 
this ex post perspective."). 
250 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327. 
251 In evaluating whether an opinion is reasonably based, there is an inter-
esting debate concerning whose perspective should be considered. Compare 
Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327-28 n.5, 1330--31 n.ll ("objective" test that looks 
at the perspective of a reasonable investor, which may include consistency with 
industry practice or reliance on advice from regulators), with id. at 1336-37 
(Scalis, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) \'subjective" 
test that looks at the perspective of the speaker instead of the listener). 
252 Professor Wendy Couture appeared to have erroneously conflated "objec-
tively false" and "objectively unreasonable." See Wendy Gerwick Couture, 
Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381 passim (2013); 
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law antifraud provisions do not expose issuers to liability for mere 
"untrue statements," and thus not for ex post inaccurate projections 
that were genuinely believed and objectively based when made.253 
Rather, the offense is the ex ante falsehood254...._be it an untrue 
statement of one's truly-held projection (assuming materiality),255 
id. at 404 C"The falsity of an opinion is established only if it is both objectively 
and subjectively false."); id. at 414 C'As this Article has argued so far ... an 
opinion is only false if the speaker both objectively unreasonably and subjec-
tively disbelieved it."). In reality, an issuer's projection that was genuinely 
held and objectively based---t~uch as by relying on applicable regulations and 
following professional guidelines and industry practice-may still turn out to 
be inaccurate. To equate "objectively false" with "objectively unreasonable'' would 
turn an antifraud-compliant projection into a "guarantee" of realization. "The 
[Securities] Act does not go that far." See United States, Omnicare Amicus 
Brief, supra note 245, at 30--31; see also AICPA, GUIDE: PROSPECTIVE FINAN-
CIAL INFORMATION§ 7.01 (2013) ("The responsible party should have a reason-
ably objective basis to present a financial forecast .... The term reasonably 
objective basis communicates to responsible parties a measure of the quality of 
information that is necessary to present a financial forecast."); Kripke, supra 
note 5. 
The second error in Professor Couture's statement (that "[t]he falsity of an 
opinion is established only if it is both objectively and subjectively false," see 
supra, at 404) is that she conflates ex post and ex ante perspectives, and would 
have the ex post outcome of an opinion partially determine or bear upon the 
ex ante falsity of the opinion. But the U.S. federal securities laws distinguish 
between ex ante and ex post perspectives, and do not Monday morning quar-
terback an issuer's opinion. See supra note 249; see also Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1327. 
Thirdly, Professor Couture's "both objectively and subjectively false" or 
"dual-falsity" proposition (see supra, at 404, 407) conflicts with the 1994 and 2010 
SEC positions and the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court Omnicare decision. Both the 
SEC and the Omnicare Court hold that an opinion is false either because it 
falsely describes one's own state of mind or because it is not reasonably based. 
To establish falsehood of an opinion does not require both. See supra text 
accompanying note 244; Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326, 1328--29 n.6. 
253 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325--26. The Author's argument here as-
sumes that either there was no duty to update a projection or that such a duty 
had been satisfied. 
254 See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995) 
1332 (''The securities laws approach matters from an ex ante perspective: just 
as a statement true when made does not become fraudulent because things 
unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materially false when made does not 
become acceptable because it happens to come true."). 
255 A temporal distinction (i.e., an inadvertent ex post correct result versus 
an inadvertent ex ante correct assessment) exists between the two scenarios: 
where an ex ante false projection happens to materialize due to unexpected 
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or an omission of material facts conflicting with a reasonable 
investor's fair inferences of the projection's basis. Only such ex 
ante material misstatement or omission, rather than the ex post 
non-eventuation ofthe projection, should be subject to liability.256 
In contrast to such an ex ante perspective of "fact" in an opinion, 
and consistent with their ex post perspective of "fact" in the defi-
nition of "securities-related false statement" as "an untrue state-
ment contrary to facts,"257 Chinese securities regulators adopt a 
bright-line approach to projection regulation. Ex ante, issuers are 
required to expressly warrant the "accuracy" and "objectivity" of 
their earnings projections.25B Ex post, the regulators penalize issu-
ers for projection inaccuracies exceeding the regulatory thresholds 
arbitrarily and uniformly set for all industries irrespective of their 
characteristics or volatilities.259 Such ex ante accuracy warranty 
is counterproductive to investor protection, as users of projections 
would be better served with information concerning uncertainty 
associated with the projections, such as probability statements260 
intervening events, and where a person thinks he is lying but is accidentally 
actually telling the truth about the subject matter of his opinion. In the latter 
"rare" case, courts have not imposed liability under Section 10(b) or Section 14 
of the Securities Exchange Act or Section 11 of the Securities Act for such sheer 
"impurities" of the "unclean heart." See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1326 n.2 (cit-
ing Va. Bankaharea v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991) (quoting 
Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)). The latter sce-
nario would fail, but the former scenario may meet, the materiality teat. See 
id.; see also supra note 254. 
256 See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. passim; see also Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 
470 (2d Cir. 1978) (equating the claim to "alleging fraud by hindsight''); DiLeo 
v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that there is 
no "fraud by hindsight"). 
257 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
258 See supra text accompanying note 140. While the stock exchanges man-
date "accuracy" representation, the CSRC requires a "uniform" cautionary leg-
end. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
259 See supra text accompanying notes 64--66, 128, 206--11; cf Sudip Datta, 
Mai Iskandar-Datta & Vivek Sharma, Product market pricing power, industry 
concentration and analysts' earnings forecasts, 35 J. BANK & FIN. 1352, 1352--53 
(2011) (stating that firma in more concentrated industries are expected to have 
higher earnings forecastability due to greater pricing power, whereas firms in 
fragmented, competitive industries are expected to have lower earnings fore-
castability due to greater information complexity). 
280 See supra text accompanying notes 197-98; see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.10(b)(3)(i) (2016) (exhorting forecasting issuers to caution investors 
against attributing undue certainty to management projections); cf Beecher 
524 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
and meaningful caution.s.261 The ex post inaccuracy penalty mech-
anism motivates issuers' strategic projection behaviors, such as 
"projecting" ex post facto 262 and earnings management, 263 to 
achieve greater forecast accuracy.264 Issuer forecasts distorted by 
such ex post policy deprive forecasting of its resource allocation 
role.265 Public enforcement based solely on ex post variance can 
result in mistaken liability or ''Type I error'' for good faith, reason-
ably made projections that do not materialize, thus discouraging 
voluntary disclosure. It can also result in mistaken innocence or 
"Type II error'' for fraudulent projections that happen to come true, 
thus reducing enforcement deterrence.266 This Article recommends 
v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[A] reasonably prudent inves-
tor would conclude [from an earnings forecast] that it was highly probable that 
the forecast would be realized."); Kowal v. IBM (In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig.), 
163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that statements regarding projections 
of future performance may be actionable under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 if 
they are worded as guarantees or are supported by specific statements of fact). 
261 See Asher v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729, 734--35 (7th Cir. 2004). 
An issuer's cautionary language accompanying the public projections may not 
be "meaningful'' within the statutory safe harbor when it did not mention the 
(or any of the) important sources of variance. Id. at 734. The safe harbor may 
apply if the issuer can establish that ite "cautions did reveal what were, ex ante, 
the major risks." Id. at 735. The statute "rules out a caution such as: 'This is a 
forward-looking statement; caveat emptor.m Id. at 729; cf. supra text accompany-
ing note 61 (discussing the CSRC's "uniform cautionary legend" requirement). 
262 See supra Table 3. 
263 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
264 See Stephen P. Baginski, John M. Hassell & Michael D. Kimbrough, The 
Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Manage-
ment Earnings Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets, 77 ACCT. REV. 
25, 48 (2002) (providing empirical evidence to demonstrate that the legal regime 
is associated with management forecasting behavior); Jonathan L. Rogers & 
Phillip C. Stocken, Credibility of Management Forecasts, 80 ACCT. REV. 1233, 
1247 (2005) (concluding that earnings management can affect forecast errors). 
265 See Martin Walker, Forecast Disclosure: An Information Economics 
Perspective, 12 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 355, 368 (1985) (stating that benefits from 
the allocation role of forecasts can only arise if the forecasts are made avail-
able in time for resource reallocation to take place); Ronald King, Grace 
Pownall & Gregory Waymire, Expectations Adjustment via Timely Manage-
ment Forecasts: Review, Synthesis, and Suggestions for Future Research, 9 J. 
ACCT. LIT. 113, 124 (1990) (arguing that for a disclosure to adjust investor ex-
pectations, it must be credible, precise, and timely). 
268 See A Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. EcoN. LIT. 45, 60--62 (2000) (discussing errors in 
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introducing a "fact versus opinion" concept into the Chinese 
securities laws' definition of "false statement," and a reorienta-
tion from the ex post variance-based naive enforcement267 to an ex 
ante fact-based determination of falsehood in projections. 
Where an issuer's projection contains a misstatement or an 
omission as determined on an ex ante basis, materiality of the 
falsehood26B must be ascertained for fraud liability to attach.269 
Under U.S. case law, "a misrepresentation or omission is 'material' 
if a reasonable investor would have considered the information 
significant when contemplating a statutorily relevant investment 
decision."270 The Chinese securities laws prescribe no general defi-
nition of "materiality" but define, in the context of required current 
reporting of material events, a "material event'' as "the occurrence 
of an event investors' knowledge of which may produce a sub-
stantial impact on the trading prices of the issuer's stock and/or 
its derivatives."271 
public enforcement of law); c{. RON LARsON & BETSY FARBER, ELEMENTARY 
STATISTICS 323-24 (2nd ed. 2004) (defining Type I and Type II errors). 
267 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 128, 206--11. 
268 A materiality assessment should be made of the misrepresentation or 
omission, rather than of any particular categories of information as inherently 
significant to investors. The latter approach is rightly criticized by a commen-
tator as "add[ing] little discipline to the process" and "go[ing] beyond the 
established legal standard." Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality 
Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 Bus. LAW. 
317, 327-28 (2007). 
269 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension 
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1326--27, 1329 (2015) (noting that liabilities for opin-
ion statements under Section ll's false statement provision and omissions 
provision are both conditioned on materiality); see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 237-38 (discussing materiality in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
context); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (dis-
cussing materiality in Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 context). 
270 Chadbourne & Parke v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (citing Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318--19 (2011)). See also 
Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327 ("[W]hether a statement is 'misleading' depends 
on the perspective of a reasonable investor: The inquiry (like the one into 
materiality) is objective."). 
271 See SECURITIES LAW 2014, supra note 45, art. 67; CSRC 2007-40, supra 
note 76, art. 30; see also supra note 229; cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 230.408(a) 
(2016), 240.12b-2, 240.12b-20 (2016) (requiring "such further material infor-
mation" to be added to the information expressly required in a Securities Act 
registration statement or an Exchange Act statement or report, as may be 
526 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
Whether under a "reasonable investor would consider signifi-
cant" standard or a "substantial market price impact'' standard,272 
materiality of any factual falsehood in an earnings projection 
should be evaluated on an ex ante basis, i.e., the effect on the rea-
sonable investor or on the market price of the relevant security 
at the time of the projection, rather than the subsequent time of 
earnings realization.273 Disclosure of realized earnings does not 
necessary to make the reqlrired statements made not mialeacling; and de-
fining the term "material''). 
272 For a critical analyslil of the reasonable investor-baaed traditional model 
versus the market price-based market model of the investment decision, see 
generally Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud 
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1 (1983). For an argu-
ment that Basic and TSC Industries accommodate both definitions of materi-
ality, see generally Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 517 (2014). See also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413-14 (2014) (elaborating on the four prerequisites for in-
voking the Basic presumption, stating that if a misrepresentation was im-
material, it would not have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the "total Jnix'' of information made available, and could 
not have distorted the stock's market price). 
273 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 272, at 6--7 n.19 (arguing that information 
that is stale or not credible would be disregarded by the market); ARNOLD S. 
JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:29 n.19 
(2014) (''Materiality is measured when the alleged violation occurred."); see 
also Future Economic Performance Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at 
20,318 (stating that the determination as to compliance with the safe harbor 
criteria would be based on the facts at the time the projection was disclosed). 
Both the fraud-on-the-market theory and the truth-on-the-market theory point 
to the time when the material misstatement or omission occurred. See Donald 
C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-too-Market: Reflections on Amgen 
and tlw Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARiz. L. REV. 37, 56 (2015) ("If the 
facta at issue appear to be material, one can fairly presume that their misrep-
resentation or omission would necessarily distort the market price unless the 
market somehow already knew the truth."). The term "price distortion" (or price 
impact) should be clifferentiated from the term "price reaction" (or price change, 
price move, price adjustment). Price distortion refers to the market price being 
clifferent from what it otherwise would have been absent the misrepresentation. 
Price reaction refers to the visible market price change as may be captured and 
measured by an event study. A "confirmatory lie," ie., a misstatement made to 
meet the existing market expectations, demonstrates the difference. A confir-
matory lie at the time of its making may produce a fraudulent price distor-
tion without producing any apparent price move, such as by preventing the 
prevailing market price from falling. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, 
Revisiting Basic, 69 Bus. LAw. 671, §§ III-A, III-D (2014). 
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equate with the "corrective disclosure" in the event study sense. 274 
By definition, corrective disclosure reveals the truth. 275 The "truth" 
in a management earnings forecast is not, however, the "realized" 
earnings but is the management's ex ante genuinely-held and 
objectively based "expectation" of earnings.276 Similarly, the con-
cept of "forecast error," measured as the difference between real-
ized earnings and forecast earnings properly scaled,277 does not 
equate with the concept of "economic loss," measured by the differ-
ence between the artificial price paid and the corrected market 
price when the truth is revealed.27B 
A forecast error reflects both information arriving between 
the earnings forecast date and the earnings report date and any 
management bias or deviation from its true expectations.279 Thus, 
"forecast error" can be decomposed into a "true" forecast error com-
ponent and a ''bias" component. The "true" forecast error compo-
nent, reflecting post-forecast macroeconomic shock, industry 
condition, and firm-specific information,2so should not expose the 
274 For the use of event studies to determine materiality, see, for example, 
Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Secu-
rities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
49 Bus. LAw. 545 (1994). 
275 Donald C. Langevoort, Compared to What? Econometric Evidence and 
the Counterfactual Difficulty, 35 J. CORP. L. 183, 187 (2010). See also Allen 
Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule lOb-5 Causes 
of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 Bus. 
LAw. 163, 166, 170 (2008) (explaining that the "truth" the Dura Court is re-
ferring to is the revelation to the market, or the so-called "corrective disclosure," 
of the actionable misconduct that forms the basis for the Rule 10b-5 cause 
of action). 
276 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318, passim (2014). 
277 See supra text accompanying note 151. 
278 See Robert N. Rapp, Plausible Cause: Exploring the Limits of Loss 
Causation in Pleading and Proving Market Fraud Claims Under Securities 
Exchange Act§ IO(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 389, 399 (2015); 
see also Dura Pharma., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (stating that 
the securities statutes make private securities fraud actions available, not to 
provide investors with broad insurance against market losses, but to protect 
investors against economic losses actually caused by the misrepresentations). 
279 Maureen McNichols, Evidence of Informational Asymmetries from Man-
agement Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns, 64 AcCT. REv. 1, 2, 6-7 (1989). 
280 Id. at 19 n.17, 25. Cf. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342--43 (stating that in the loss 
causation context, intervening causes such as "changed economic circum-
stances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific 
528 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:459 
forecasting issuer to liability under Omnicare's "genuinely held" 
and "objectively based" standards. 281 The "bias" component, be it 
management's intentional bias to misrepresent thus conflicting 
with Omnicare's "actually held'' standard,282 or management's 
cognitive biases thus conflicting with Omnicare's "objectively 
based" standard,283 should be measured for materiality. This 
facts, conditions, or other events," rather than "the earlier misrepresentation," 
may have caused all or part of the later loss). 
281 See supra text accompanying notes 246-4 7, 250. 
282 See supra text accompanying note 246; see also McNichols, supra note 
279, at 17. 
283 See supra text accompanying note 247 (discussing lack of reasonable 
basis as a disjunctive test for establishing falsehood of an opinion); see also 
McNichols, supra note 279, at 17 (requiring an expectation of earnings to be 
both "true" and "unbiased" to qualify for true forecast error); cf. supra note 252 
(arguing for a "dual falsity'' test for establishing falsehood of an opinion). 
For legal literature commenting on management's intentional bias and 
cognitive bias, see, for example, HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 256--58 (2015) (stating that a "blinded" or over· 
confident corporate officer is capable of making misleading forward·looking 
statements without deliberately intending to defraud investors, but investors 
may be hurt as much or more by such misleading forward· looking statements 
than by a deliberate scheme to defraud them). 
For economic and accounting literature studying managerial forecasting 
biases, see generally Guojin Gong, Laura Y. Li & Jeff J. Wang, Serial Corre· 
lation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 677 (2011) 
(concluding that management earnings forecast errors should not exhibit se· 
rial correlation if managers truthfully convey their earnings expectations and 
efficiently process information, i.e., management has neither intentional bias 
to misrepresent nor cognitive bias); Gilles Hilary & Charles Hsu, Endogenous 
Overconfidence in Managerial Forecasts, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 300 (2011) 
(documenting that managers' self·serving attribution cognitive bias led to 
less accurate forecasts subsequent to a series of accurate predictions); Paul 
Hribar & Holly Yang, Does CEO Overconfidence Affect Management Fore· 
casting and Subsequent Earnings Management? (Mar. 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://web·docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/accounting/docs/Summer 
_Camp/Hribar.Yang,Does.CEO.Overconfidence.Affect.Mgmt ... pdf [https://perma 
.cc/6PU2· VVUH] (concluding that overconfident managers are more likely to 
issue optimistically biased forecasts); Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. 
Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Mis· 
reporting, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 311 (2012) (concluding that overconfident ex· 
ecutives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and thus are more likely 
to start down a slippery slope of growing intentional misstatements, possibly 
to the degree of fraudulent intent within the meaning of SEC Rule 10b·5). &e 
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Article recommends the abandonment of the CSRC's current 
20 percent/50 percent forecast error policy (i.e., "public apology" 
and related penalties for a 20 percent ex post over-projection 
and a "three-year offering ban'' for a 50 percent ex post over-
projection2B"-itself a biased enforcement policy indeed). In lieu 
thereof, it recommends the adoption of a "random error versus 
bias" decomposition approach to assess materiality of an ex ante 
untrue projection. 285 
also Hirst et al., supra note 189 (citing managers' varied economic incentives 
to issue upward or downward biased forecasts). 
284 See supra note 267. In 1975, the SEC solicited comments on "whether 
specific percentage tests of materiality should be adopted for projections and, 
if so, what percentage would be appropriate." See Future Economic Perfor-
mance Projections, supra note 171, 40 Fed. Reg. at 20,317-18. 
285 See McNichols, supra note 279, at 22; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Rethinking Damages in &curities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1498 
n.39 (1996) ("[P]rojections or statements about the future can turn out to be 
wrong through bad luck or bad judgment as well as fraud."); Healy & Palepu, 
supra note 6, at 423 (commenting that the legal system will be penalizing 
forecasts made in good faith if it cannot effectively distinguish between un-
expected forecast errors due to chance and those due to deliberate manage-
ment bias); cf. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 n.9, 238-39 (applying a 
probability/magnitude test of materiality to contingent or speculative infor-
mation or events such as preliminary merger negotiations, but noting "[w]e 
do not address here any other kinds of contingent or speculative information, 
such as earnings forecasts or projections."). 
For the use of the "statistically significant" concept to determine "materiality" 
in the securities fraud context, compare Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, 
Fraud on the Marhet Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 507--00 
(2006) (noting that in an efficient market, if the price impact of a misleading 
information (or a corrective disclosure) is statistically insignificant, then the in-
formation (or the disclosure) is immaterial at that time; in an inefficient mar-
ket, such a direct link between materiality of the information to the average 
market participant and the stock price response to the information does not nec-
essarily hold), with Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 
(2011) (stating that, in assessing the materiality of drug adverse event reports 
for disclosure purposes under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the reports' sta-
tistical significance or lack thereof is not dispositive of every case; and that a 
"fact-specific'' inquiry into the source, content, and context of the reports is 
required (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 236)). Under the "random 
error vs. bias" decomposition approach proposed in this Article, only the price 
impact attributable to the bias component at the time of the earnings projec-
tion should be tested for materiality, by statistical significance or otherwise. 
See supra text accompanying notes 240-41, 246--4 7, 272--83. Where an earnings 
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CONCLUSION 
Issuer forecasting fares with striking differences under the 
two regimes. In the United States, issuer earnings forecasts are 
discretionary.2B6 In China, earnings forecasts are mandatory for 
issuers whose expected earnings meet regulator-set risk or vola-
tility benchmarks, who use offering proceeds for significant asset 
purchases, or who effect a related party Significant Assets Re-
structuring (SAR).2B7 In the United States, the forecasting issu-
ers are exposed to private litigation risk,2BB but are also shielded 
by safe harbors and demanding liability standards.2B9 In China, 
projection is found materially false ex ante, proof of any economic loss in a 
private fraud action should also be subject to such a "random error vs. bias'' 
decomposition test, to wring out any market loss which may be reflected in the 
realized earnings report. &e, e.g., Dura, 544 U.S. at 343, 345; Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (citing Dura, 544 
U.S. at 342--43) ("Loss causation ... requires a plaintiff to show that a misrep-
resentation that affected the integrity of the market price also caused a 
subsequent economic loss .... If one of those [intervening] factors were re-
sponsible for the loss or part of it, a plaintiff would not be able to prove loss 
causation to that extent."). For calculation methodologies, see generally Allen 
Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Forward-Casting lOb-5 Damages: A Comparison to Oth2r 
Methods, 37 J. CORP. L. 365, 366--67, Part V (2012) (proposing a forward-
casting method in place of the back-casting methods for estimating Rule lOb-5 
damages, and stating that the analysis is also useful in determining whether 
the misinformation was "material"). 
286 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
287 See supra Parts LA, I.B, I. C. 
288 There are eight express private rights of action under the Securities Act 
and the Exchange Act, and four implied private causes of action under the 
Exchange Act; most relate to material misrepresentations and omissions. See 
Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of th£ 
Effect of th£ PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 
76 WASH. U. L. Q. 537, 541 n. 7 (1998). 
288 The statutory safe harbor requires a private plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant acted "with actual knowledge" of the falsity. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-
2(c)(l)(B), 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (2012). Even if a defendant fails the safe harbor, for 
the plaintiff to prevail on a Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 general antifraud 
private action, it must plead and prove six elements, including scienter 
proven by "a strong inference." See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (stating that Section lO(b) was de-
signed as "a catch-all clause'' for fraud); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)) (setting forth six elements a plaintiff 
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the securities laws provide no express or implied private right of 
action to investors on account of fraudulent forward-looking 
statements;290 nor do the securities laws provide any safe harbor 
to the forecasting issuers. 291 
Instead, issuer forecasts are regulated by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange according to their respective jurisdic-
tions and respective standards.292 Public enforcement of issuer 
forecasts is effected via a confidential Central Fidelity File Sys-
tem, which scores and records any substantial discrepancies be-
tween an issuer's forecasted earnings and realized earnings, and 
the CSRC and other government agencies mete out regulatory and 
administrative rewards and penalties based on the ex post accu-
racy or inaccuracy of an issuer's projections.293 
Most notable is the CSRC's "20 percent/50 percent" rule: an 
issuer with a 20 percent ex post over-projection must offer public 
apologies, and an issuer with a 50 percent ex post over-projection 
shall be denied access to the public offering market for a pe-
riod of three years-unless exonerated by the CSRC on an unde-
fined "force majeure" ground. Complementary to the stick is the 
carrot: an issuer with ex post accurate earnings projections will 
be granted favorable treatment when it applies for a securities 
offering.294 Empirical data sampled by this Article analyzing the 
must prove in a typical Section 10(b) private action: "(1) a material misrepre-
sentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between 
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; ( 4) re-
liance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (de-
fining "scienter'' as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, 
or defraud."); Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) 
(holding that a "strong'' inference of scienter is one that is "more than merely 
plausible or reasonable" but is "cogent and at least as compelling as any op-
posing inference of nonfraudulent intent."). Even though Section 11 liability 
against issuers is "virtually absolute," it is "no small task" for investors to 
prove an issuer's unfulfilled opinion misleading. &e Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council 
Contr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1332 (2015). 
200 See supra text accompanying notes 212-27. 
291 See supra Part II.B.l. 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 153--63. 
293 See supra text accompanying notes 204-11. 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66, 128. 
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FY 2013 earnings forecasts by Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange listed issuers show that more than 50 percent were is-
sued ex post facto in 2014.295 Empirical literature reviewed by this 
Article has noted listed issuers' use of government subsidies to 
meet regulatory requirements or market expectations. 296 This 
Article argues that issuers' strategic forecasting behavior and 
earnings management may have been induced by regulators' ac-
counting number-based ex post accuracy policy. 
To regulate the Chinese listed issuers' earnings forecasts and 
other forward-looking disclosure, this Article recommends the 
construction of a legal framework that is fair, open, and trans-
parent. Underlying the legal framework could be a centralized, 
CSRC-administered issuer disclosure and reporting system for 
both historical and forward-looking information, to ensure a level 
playing field for issuers listed on the SHSE (which features large, 
state-controlled issuers) and those on the SZSE (which features 
private entrepreneur-controlled issuers).297 One pillar supporting 
the legal framework should be an open and independent judicial 
system, to be recognized by the Constitution of the People's Re-
public of China, and a meaningful express private right of action 
to investors on account of fraudulent forward-looking informa-
tion, to be written into the Securities Law of the People's Republic 
of China. Not only does public enforcement by the confidential 
Central Fidelity File System fail to provide economic compensation 
to investors, but such a confidential system also creates an infor-
mation asymmetry between investors and regulated entities and 
increases the risk of regulatory capture.29B Equally important is 
the other pillar of the legal framework: a safe harbor for forward-
looking statements conditional on an advance audit review. As 
the literature demonstrates, the market benefits from informa-
tional intermediaries' monitoring role, and investors and issuers 
alike benefit from increased amounts of quality corporate disclo-
sure in the marketplace.299 
295 See supra text accompanying note 152; supra Table 3. 
296 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
297 See supra text accompanying notes 164-70. 
298 See supra Part II.B.2. 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 3--6; supra Part II.B.l. 
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This Article also recommends an ex ante versus ex post per-
spective as a theoretical guide to the legal framework and the dis-
closure system. With respect to voluntary earnings projections or 
discretionary disclosure in general, economic theory has espoused 
an economically efficient disclosure regime.300 This Article argues 
that, rather than requiring issuer ex ante disclosure of assump-
tions and ex post disclosure ofvariances,30l it is more meaningful 
to require an ex ante audit review of issuer's material assump-
tions together with an ex ante issuer's disclosure of probabilistic 
statements.302 Similarly, rather than imposing "a duty to update" 
a voluntary disclosure thus converting a voluntary disclosure act 
into a mandatory continuous disclosure obligation, 303 it would bet-
ter encourage voluntary disclosure to have a mechanism that al-
lows issuers to make efficiency-based voluntary disclosure choices, 
such as a requirement for a timely issued current report to disclose 
discontinuance of projections. 304 
The Chinese legal system may benefit from the U.S. legal the-
ory enunciating the "untrue statement of ... fact" in an opinion.305 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court's Omnicare standard, an opinion 
which ex ante (i.e., at the time of its making) was actually held 
and reasonably based-as viewed from the perspective of a rea-
sonable investor-precludes liability, even though the opinion 
was erroneous ex post. An opinion which ex ante was either not 
genuinely believed or not reasonably based triggers liability 
(assuming materiality).306 
In contrast to Basic's reasonable investor test for materiality 
of a misrepresentation or omission,307 the Chinese securities laws 
adopt a market price test for materiality of certain current events 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 182--87. 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 22, 61, 135; supra note 26. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 195--98. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 23--26, 30, 134. 
304 See supra text accompanying notes 187--89. 
305 See supra text accompanying notes 240-48. 
306 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Contr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1326--29 n.6 (2015); cf. supra note 252. 
307 See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231--32, 240; see also supra text ac-
companying note 270; 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2016) (defining the term "material"), 
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2016) (defining the term "material"); cf Booic, 485 U.S. 
at 232 n.9. 
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specified by the Securities Law.sos To assess the materiality of an 
ex ante false earnings projection (and proof of economic loss at-
tributable to an earnings projection materially false ex ante), 
this Article proposes a "random error versus bias" decomposition 
approach, to separate the ex post random error component from 
the ex ante management bias component. It suggests that, con-
sistent with Omnicare's fact-opinion dichotomy and fact-opinion 
possible mutual embedment, only the management bias compo-
nent of the forecast error--be it management's intentional bias 
to misrepresent or cognitive biases-should be subject to the 
"untrue statement of a material fact" analysis. soa 
Debate in economics and finance literature over the relative 
virtues of public versus private enforcement310 has not examined 
the China phenomenon. In this Article, the Author argues against 
enforcement solely by the government pursuant to a confidential 
and discretionary Fidelity regulation regime. The Article recom-
mends a conditional private right of action to supplement public 
enforcement against materially false or misleading forward-
looking statements. Further sophistication of the Chinese issuers 
and investors, as well as China's legal system, may provide a new 
ground to test the public versus private enforcement theories. 
308 See supra text accompanying notes 229, 271. 
309 See supra text accompanying notes 268--85. 
310 Compare R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes & A. Shleifer, What Works in 
Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (arguing that securities laws matter not 
because of public regulatory enforcement, but because of extensive disclosure 
requirements and standards of liability to improve market discipline and pri-
vate litigation), with Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private 
Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 
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